What the French call le telephone arabe is ringing off the hook since the announcement that Syrian Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan killed himself earlier today. Some of the most interesting speculation, as usual, is on Joshua Landis's syriacomment.com:
Was Ghazi Kanaan setting himself up to be Bashar's alternative? Could he have been the Alawite "Musharrif" that some American's and Volker Perthes suggested would take power from the House of Asad and bring Syria back into America's and the West's good graces. I have heard from several people that "high ranking Syrians" have been complaining to people at the National Security Council and elsewhere that they are very distressed by the mistakes Bashar al-Asad has made and the terrible state of US-Syrian relations.
Could Ghazi have been setting himself up as the alternative to Bashar? Could the Syrian government believe he might have been? We don't know, but here goes the possible speculation. He is known to have had good relations with Washington, when he held the Lebanon portfolio. He visited DC. Two of his four sons went to George Washington University in DC.
Kanaan was reported to have been one of the "Old Guard" who spoke out against the extension of Emile Lahoud's presidency in Lebanon, which set the stage for Lebanon's Cedar revolution and the assassination of P.M. Rafiq Hariri. He had been one of the Syrians responsible for cultivating Hariri and building up his position in Lebanon. He was also accused of having significant business relations in Lebanon which tied him to Hariri. It is unlikely that he was involved in Hariri's murder, having been a Hariri and not Lahoud supporter.
His relations with Lahoud were strained, and Lahoud reportedly was one of the people who insisted that he be removed from the Lebanon file and replaced by Rustum Ghazali. (Told me by Nick Blanford of the Christian Science Monitor, who is writing a book on Hariri.)
Since the June Baath Party Conference, it has been rumored that Ghazi would lose his Cabinet position as Minister of Interior, where he had been causing quite a ruckus.
Kanaan was the most senior Alawi official left in government of the Hafiz's generation. He had served as an intelligence chief and minister of interior giving him influence over and knowledge of all branches of the security forces - intelligence and police. If Washington were to turn to anyone to carry out a coup against Bashar, it would have to place Ghazi Kanaan on the top of its list.
Could Kanaan have been assassinated in order to prevent him from challenging Bashar? We may never know, but it is possible.
Bashar al-Asad has been clamping down on all possible rivals. Civil society has been all but silenced since the June Baath Party conference. The Atasi forum shut down. Evidently Anwar al-Bunni, Damascus' leading civil rights lawyer and advocate is presently in hiding so he would be arrested. All emerging political movements have been broken up during the past several months. The Kurds are under intense pressure as are all Islamic organizations. Bashar's strongest suit is that there is not alternative to his rule. Washington must either accept him as president or tempt the fates that Syria will collapse into some form of social chaos. Now that Ghazi Kanaan is no longer alive, it is hard to imagine another Alawi in the government who would have the authority, knowledge, or standing to pull off a coup.
Wednesday, October 12, 2005
Syria: Kanaan Falls on His Sword
Just out on the wires, this from the BBC:
Syrian minister 'commits suicide'
Syria's Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan has committed suicide, the official news agency in Damascus says.
He was reportedly questioned by a UN investigator last month over the murder of ex-Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri.
For many years Kanaan was Syria's powerful intelligence chief in Lebanon, which was dominated by Syria until its military withdrawal earlier this year.
He returned to Damascus in 2002 as political intelligence chief and joined the cabinet in 2004.
"Interior Minister Brig Gen Ghazi Kanaan committed suicide in his office before noon," the Syrian Arab News Agency (Sana) reported.
Since he gave up the Lebanese dossier in 2002, Kanaan's power in Syria waned as well. He was one of the old guard, not the new crowd among Bashar's siblings and in-laws. As such, in the mafia state that is Syria today, he probably seemed expendable. But there was a time, during the most dangerous years of the Lebanese war, when Kanaan pulled all the strings. This excerpt from an article I wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1987 gives, perhaps, some notion of the way Kanaan and Assad pere operated, as well as the limits of their power at that time:
The pace of abductions was quickening. Soon it appeared to be out of Syrian control. By mid-June 1985 one group of Iranian-backed kidnappers, calling itself Islamic Jihad and linked to the Mousavi clan, had accumulated six American hostages, including a newsman, a hospital director, an academic, two priests and the CIA station chief William Buckley who, by then, was dying. There were also two French diplomats and two French journalists in Jihad's hands. Assad was proffering his good offices, but to no avail. Then on June 14 a related group of Iranian-backed Shi'ites hijacked TWA Flight 847 and 40 new American hostages were flown to Beirut. One was murdered.
Assad maneuvered. His ally, Nabih Berri, intervened and all but four of the Americans were put in the custody of Amal. But it was just at this point that Assad's impotence began to be evident. The four Americans in the hands of the radicals effectively gave them leverage over all the others. Assad negotiated and cajoled, and his spokesman announced that all would be freed. Then, to his considerable embarrassment, the radicals said no, new conditions had to be met. Another day went by before the TWA hostages finally were freed, but the six Americans and four French previously abducted were not.
Washington and Paris were losing confidence in Assad's ability to deliver, and as they did so they turned more and more to direct -- if secret -- negotiations with Iran. The arms-for-hostages deals cut by the Reagan Administration with Tehran eventually sidestepped Assad even as a token participant, and the Iranians moved to squeeze him out of the picture altogether. Meanwhile their militias treated both Syria's professional soldiers and its proxies with growing contempt. Firefights broke out in Baalbek between Syrian troops and Hezbollah militiamen in May 1986. The next month two members of the Damascus-backed Syrian Social Nationalist Party were kidnapped by Shi'ites associated with Hezbollah; their bullet-riddled bodies were found two days later. Five days of fighting followed around the Bekaa Valley town of Mashgara. In October, when the Syrians arrested two members of the militias in Mashgara, the Shi'ite radicals responded by kidnapping four Syrian soldiers. Not until the Syrian army freed its prisoners were the soldiers returned.
Adding to the chaos was the factionalism of the fundamentalists themselves, both in Lebanon and Iran. Mehdi Hashemi and several other Iranians especially committed to exporting their revolution began operating in defiance of sectors of the Iranian government. Syrians got caught up in this feud and in October 1986 Syria's charge d'affairs in Tehran -- said by diplomats there to have an extensive intelligence background -- was abducted and beaten by Hashemi partisans. Hashemi himself was arrested soon afterward, but the stain of the affront endured. {Note: After Hashemi's arrest his associates leaked to a Lebanese magazine the story of U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's visit to Tehran. It was reprinted in a pro-Syrian Beirut newspaper, Al-Shiraa, where Western news media picked it up. See "Iran's Quest for Superpower Status," Gary Sick, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987, pp. 706-708.}
Throughout this period Western diplomats in the region commonly argued that Assad could release the Western hostages if he cared to. His security services were bound to know where many of the hostages were being held and who was holding them. But if some were freed by force, others were likely to be killed. Assad would get little credit for corpses and considerable blame from the West, and meanwhile would have poisoned his already delicate relations with Tehran. He had less room to maneuver than many realized. The hostages were essentially an emotional problem for the United States and France. But for Assad their continued captivity was a direct affront, a constant test of his influence, which he seemed unable to meet.
By November 1986 Assad needed a gesture, a symbol of his strength as well as his goodwill, that would increase his political capital. Syrian intelligence services had been implicated in terrorist attempts in Europe; Britain, the United States and Europe took actions of protest. Perhaps worse from Assad's point of view, he was seen as a man of waning capabilities; news reports often raised the question of his health.
At just that moment came a breakthrough in the hostage situation, resulting, as we now know, from the secret arms shipments from Washington to Tehran: Islamic Jihad released American University Hospital administrator David Jacobsen. Here was an opportunity for Assad to recoup. But instead of sending him out through Damascus -- the route other hostages had gone -- Jihad arranged his liberation in such a way that Syria could take no credit. Far from the profuse thanks to which he was accustomed, Assad was all but ignored.
The affronts to Assad are not always so subtle. In the summer of 1986 Syria deployed about 300 uniformed "advisers" and hundreds more plainclothes agents in West Beirut to help impose a "security plan." But they were barred from entering the city's teeming southern suburbs, where Hezbollah holds sway and is believed to hold most of its Western captives. Meanwhile a new wave of kidnappings began, led by a group calling itself the Revolutionary Justice Organization. With much the same techniques as Islamic Jihad, the new group was picking up new hostages, it seemed, whenever old ones were about to be released.
Hostility between the Hezbollah militiamen and the Syrian advisers continued to mount: in February 1987, in a ludicrous but humiliating confrontation, Syrian soldiers and Lebanese police patrolling West Beirut were surrounded by Hezbollah militiamen, disarmed, beaten and their heads shaved.
It was less than two weeks later that Assad began a full-scale deployment of 7,000 troops in Beirut. On the night of February 24, 1987, his soldiers entered the Basta neighborhood and approached the Fathallah barracks. Most of the Hezbollah fighters headquartered there had pulled out after burning tires inside the building to cover any signs of the prisoners they had held there -- among them, almost certainly, American and European hostages. Scattered shots were heard, and when the Syrians were finished, 23 men and women said to have been partisans of Hezbollah lay dead. By morning, the writing on the walls of the barracks that praised the glories of Islam and "Imam" Khomeini was painted over. Now the writing on the wall praised Syria. The strike at Iran was quick and violent, but fell short of full-scale confrontation. Still Assad did not send his forces into the southern suburbs....
More on the Hariri case and its aftermath this year:
Shadowland: CSI: Beirut, 30 Mar 2005
Syria is playing for time, and the Lebanese investigation into the Hariri assassination is a farce. Meanwhile, chaos is building. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7337270/site/newsweek/
Syrian minister 'commits suicide'
Syria's Interior Minister Ghazi Kanaan has committed suicide, the official news agency in Damascus says.
He was reportedly questioned by a UN investigator last month over the murder of ex-Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri.
For many years Kanaan was Syria's powerful intelligence chief in Lebanon, which was dominated by Syria until its military withdrawal earlier this year.
He returned to Damascus in 2002 as political intelligence chief and joined the cabinet in 2004.
"Interior Minister Brig Gen Ghazi Kanaan committed suicide in his office before noon," the Syrian Arab News Agency (Sana) reported.
Since he gave up the Lebanese dossier in 2002, Kanaan's power in Syria waned as well. He was one of the old guard, not the new crowd among Bashar's siblings and in-laws. As such, in the mafia state that is Syria today, he probably seemed expendable. But there was a time, during the most dangerous years of the Lebanese war, when Kanaan pulled all the strings. This excerpt from an article I wrote for Foreign Affairs in 1987 gives, perhaps, some notion of the way Kanaan and Assad pere operated, as well as the limits of their power at that time:
The pace of abductions was quickening. Soon it appeared to be out of Syrian control. By mid-June 1985 one group of Iranian-backed kidnappers, calling itself Islamic Jihad and linked to the Mousavi clan, had accumulated six American hostages, including a newsman, a hospital director, an academic, two priests and the CIA station chief William Buckley who, by then, was dying. There were also two French diplomats and two French journalists in Jihad's hands. Assad was proffering his good offices, but to no avail. Then on June 14 a related group of Iranian-backed Shi'ites hijacked TWA Flight 847 and 40 new American hostages were flown to Beirut. One was murdered.
Assad maneuvered. His ally, Nabih Berri, intervened and all but four of the Americans were put in the custody of Amal. But it was just at this point that Assad's impotence began to be evident. The four Americans in the hands of the radicals effectively gave them leverage over all the others. Assad negotiated and cajoled, and his spokesman announced that all would be freed. Then, to his considerable embarrassment, the radicals said no, new conditions had to be met. Another day went by before the TWA hostages finally were freed, but the six Americans and four French previously abducted were not.
Washington and Paris were losing confidence in Assad's ability to deliver, and as they did so they turned more and more to direct -- if secret -- negotiations with Iran. The arms-for-hostages deals cut by the Reagan Administration with Tehran eventually sidestepped Assad even as a token participant, and the Iranians moved to squeeze him out of the picture altogether. Meanwhile their militias treated both Syria's professional soldiers and its proxies with growing contempt. Firefights broke out in Baalbek between Syrian troops and Hezbollah militiamen in May 1986. The next month two members of the Damascus-backed Syrian Social Nationalist Party were kidnapped by Shi'ites associated with Hezbollah; their bullet-riddled bodies were found two days later. Five days of fighting followed around the Bekaa Valley town of Mashgara. In October, when the Syrians arrested two members of the militias in Mashgara, the Shi'ite radicals responded by kidnapping four Syrian soldiers. Not until the Syrian army freed its prisoners were the soldiers returned.
Adding to the chaos was the factionalism of the fundamentalists themselves, both in Lebanon and Iran. Mehdi Hashemi and several other Iranians especially committed to exporting their revolution began operating in defiance of sectors of the Iranian government. Syrians got caught up in this feud and in October 1986 Syria's charge d'affairs in Tehran -- said by diplomats there to have an extensive intelligence background -- was abducted and beaten by Hashemi partisans. Hashemi himself was arrested soon afterward, but the stain of the affront endured. {Note: After Hashemi's arrest his associates leaked to a Lebanese magazine the story of U.S. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's visit to Tehran. It was reprinted in a pro-Syrian Beirut newspaper, Al-Shiraa, where Western news media picked it up. See "Iran's Quest for Superpower Status," Gary Sick, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1987, pp. 706-708.}
Throughout this period Western diplomats in the region commonly argued that Assad could release the Western hostages if he cared to. His security services were bound to know where many of the hostages were being held and who was holding them. But if some were freed by force, others were likely to be killed. Assad would get little credit for corpses and considerable blame from the West, and meanwhile would have poisoned his already delicate relations with Tehran. He had less room to maneuver than many realized. The hostages were essentially an emotional problem for the United States and France. But for Assad their continued captivity was a direct affront, a constant test of his influence, which he seemed unable to meet.
By November 1986 Assad needed a gesture, a symbol of his strength as well as his goodwill, that would increase his political capital. Syrian intelligence services had been implicated in terrorist attempts in Europe; Britain, the United States and Europe took actions of protest. Perhaps worse from Assad's point of view, he was seen as a man of waning capabilities; news reports often raised the question of his health.
At just that moment came a breakthrough in the hostage situation, resulting, as we now know, from the secret arms shipments from Washington to Tehran: Islamic Jihad released American University Hospital administrator David Jacobsen. Here was an opportunity for Assad to recoup. But instead of sending him out through Damascus -- the route other hostages had gone -- Jihad arranged his liberation in such a way that Syria could take no credit. Far from the profuse thanks to which he was accustomed, Assad was all but ignored.
The affronts to Assad are not always so subtle. In the summer of 1986 Syria deployed about 300 uniformed "advisers" and hundreds more plainclothes agents in West Beirut to help impose a "security plan." But they were barred from entering the city's teeming southern suburbs, where Hezbollah holds sway and is believed to hold most of its Western captives. Meanwhile a new wave of kidnappings began, led by a group calling itself the Revolutionary Justice Organization. With much the same techniques as Islamic Jihad, the new group was picking up new hostages, it seemed, whenever old ones were about to be released.
Hostility between the Hezbollah militiamen and the Syrian advisers continued to mount: in February 1987, in a ludicrous but humiliating confrontation, Syrian soldiers and Lebanese police patrolling West Beirut were surrounded by Hezbollah militiamen, disarmed, beaten and their heads shaved.
It was less than two weeks later that Assad began a full-scale deployment of 7,000 troops in Beirut. On the night of February 24, 1987, his soldiers entered the Basta neighborhood and approached the Fathallah barracks. Most of the Hezbollah fighters headquartered there had pulled out after burning tires inside the building to cover any signs of the prisoners they had held there -- among them, almost certainly, American and European hostages. Scattered shots were heard, and when the Syrians were finished, 23 men and women said to have been partisans of Hezbollah lay dead. By morning, the writing on the walls of the barracks that praised the glories of Islam and "Imam" Khomeini was painted over. Now the writing on the wall praised Syria. The strike at Iran was quick and violent, but fell short of full-scale confrontation. Still Assad did not send his forces into the southern suburbs....
More on the Hariri case and its aftermath this year:
Shadowland: CSI: Beirut, 30 Mar 2005
Syria is playing for time, and the Lebanese investigation into the Hariri assassination is a farce. Meanwhile, chaos is building. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7337270/site/newsweek/
Shadowland: "Spectator Patriotism"
Wars of Hate
America's conflicts are fought mostly by people who have come from the powerless classes.
America's conflicts are fought mostly by people who have come from the powerless classes.
Newsweek
Updated: 5:35 p.m. ET Oct. 11, 2005
Oct. 11, 2005 - On or about Dec. 30, 2002, which was a day after we’d had dinner in New York and a year to the day before he died of a heart attack, John Gregory Dunne put a floppy disk in an envelope and dropped it off at the Manhattan apartment where I was staying. As happens, I misplaced it in my travels after that, and only last weekend did I find it and read the digital newspaper clippings he’d pulled together, which he’d talked about with so much excitement at our dinner.
John was interested in patriotism. He was fascinated by the real substance of it, which he saw as diametrically opposed to what he called “the spectator patriotism” exploited by the Bush administration as it went looking for wars. There was something (it took a while for John to put his finger on it) in the fact that several people he knew had children on active duty: historian Doris Kearns had a son, John himself had a nephew, I had a son. We had people we loved in uniform doing what they saw, and we understood, imperfectly perhaps, as their duty to defend the values and the dreams that are the United States of America. But why were there so few from this circle of acquaintances if the cause was so great?...
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
Iraq: Sorry's Not Enough
Jackson Diehl's Washington Post column is about the bitter disappointment of Kanan Makiya ("Republic of Fear") and Rend Rahim as they look at the results of the war in Iraq that they worked so long and so hard to provoke:
"Both liberal Iraqi intellectuals and eloquent English speakers, they made the case that Saddam Hussein's removal was a cause to be embraced on moral and human rights grounds, and that its result could be the replacement of the Arab world's most brutal dictatorship by its first genuine democracy...
"That's why it was so sobering to encounter Makiya and Rahim again last week -- and to hear them speak with brutal honesty about their 'dashed hopes and broken dreams,' as Makiya put it. The occasion was a conference on Iraq sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise Institute, which did so much to lay the intellectual groundwork for the war. A similar AEI conference three years ago this month resounded with upbeat predictions about the democratic, federal and liberal Iraq that could follow Saddam Hussein. This one, led off by Makiya and Rahim, sounded a lot like its funeral.
"Makiya began with a stark conclusion: 'Instead of the fledgling democracy that back then we said was possible, instead of that dream, we have the reality of a virulent insurgency whose efficiency is only rivaled by the barbarous tactics it uses.' The violence, he said, 'is destroying the very idea or the very possibility of Iraq.' ..."
Thanks to Paul Woodward at The War in Context for bringing this to our attention. - CD
"Both liberal Iraqi intellectuals and eloquent English speakers, they made the case that Saddam Hussein's removal was a cause to be embraced on moral and human rights grounds, and that its result could be the replacement of the Arab world's most brutal dictatorship by its first genuine democracy...
"That's why it was so sobering to encounter Makiya and Rahim again last week -- and to hear them speak with brutal honesty about their 'dashed hopes and broken dreams,' as Makiya put it. The occasion was a conference on Iraq sponsored by the conservative American Enterprise Institute, which did so much to lay the intellectual groundwork for the war. A similar AEI conference three years ago this month resounded with upbeat predictions about the democratic, federal and liberal Iraq that could follow Saddam Hussein. This one, led off by Makiya and Rahim, sounded a lot like its funeral.
"Makiya began with a stark conclusion: 'Instead of the fledgling democracy that back then we said was possible, instead of that dream, we have the reality of a virulent insurgency whose efficiency is only rivaled by the barbarous tactics it uses.' The violence, he said, 'is destroying the very idea or the very possibility of Iraq.' ..."
Thanks to Paul Woodward at The War in Context for bringing this to our attention. - CD
Monday, October 10, 2005
Iran: Explosive Diplomacy, Implosive Economy
How much longer can the mullahs last? So far, they've played the game of politics and diplomacy better than any of their enemies. But the economy is something else, according to the most recent headlines from the Middle East Economic Survey:
Iran’s Oil And Gas Industry Stalemate Worsens
Iran’s oil and gas industry stalemate worsened last week, with the Majlis (parliament) passing new legislation that threatens to remove the most senior and experienced staff from government and state company positions. At the same time the government’s probe into corruption in oil and gas sector contracts continued with further arrests and the likelihood of more to come. These factors, plus the escalation of the level of threat from the international community over Iran’s nuclear program, which saw the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) take a step closer towards referring Iran to the UN Security Council (MEES, 3 October), have combined to undermine confidence among Iran’s private investors, triggering a collapse in share prices on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). ...
Iran’s Oil And Gas Industry Stalemate Worsens
Iran’s oil and gas industry stalemate worsened last week, with the Majlis (parliament) passing new legislation that threatens to remove the most senior and experienced staff from government and state company positions. At the same time the government’s probe into corruption in oil and gas sector contracts continued with further arrests and the likelihood of more to come. These factors, plus the escalation of the level of threat from the international community over Iran’s nuclear program, which saw the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) take a step closer towards referring Iran to the UN Security Council (MEES, 3 October), have combined to undermine confidence among Iran’s private investors, triggering a collapse in share prices on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE). ...
Syria: Coup d'Assad?
My colleagues Michael Hirsh and Kevin Peraino have a sharp, disturbing article in the current Newsweek, "Dangers in Damascus," about the disarray in American policy toward Syria:
...If al-Assad's rigidly secular regime were toppled, the nation's mosaic of competing sects and ethnicities could explode into conflict. Islamist radicals—including a group called Soldiers of the Levant—are already gaining influence in Syria, where they were once ruthlessly crushed. This comes as Qaeda-linked groups are trying to spread the jihadist contagion regionally, according to an alleged letter from Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri last week.
Critics say that the Bush administration isn't encouraging Syria's democrats just now—but neither is it willing to work with Syria's dictator. And in the absence of any cooperation between governments, jihadists are moving across Syria's 310-mile border with Iraq to join the insurgency. Imad Moustapha, the Syrian ambassador to Washington, told NEWSWEEK that Damascus ended all security and intelligence cooperation with America several months ago, and it has not resumed...
For those who want more detail, there are fascinating discussions about the whys, hows and wherefores of coup plotting against Assad on Joshual Landis's syriacomment.com . - CD
...If al-Assad's rigidly secular regime were toppled, the nation's mosaic of competing sects and ethnicities could explode into conflict. Islamist radicals—including a group called Soldiers of the Levant—are already gaining influence in Syria, where they were once ruthlessly crushed. This comes as Qaeda-linked groups are trying to spread the jihadist contagion regionally, according to an alleged letter from Qaeda No. 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri last week.
Critics say that the Bush administration isn't encouraging Syria's democrats just now—but neither is it willing to work with Syria's dictator. And in the absence of any cooperation between governments, jihadists are moving across Syria's 310-mile border with Iraq to join the insurgency. Imad Moustapha, the Syrian ambassador to Washington, told NEWSWEEK that Damascus ended all security and intelligence cooperation with America several months ago, and it has not resumed...
For those who want more detail, there are fascinating discussions about the whys, hows and wherefores of coup plotting against Assad on Joshual Landis's syriacomment.com . - CD
Hate-Mail Call: More on "The Suicide Solution"
This from Thomas, who doesn't give his hometown:
'Suicide bombers are morally justified in their actions because they seek to destroy only those persons and societies which illegally and unjustly repress them. George Bush is a mass murderer. All of those persons who voted for George Bush in the 2004 election knew with full certainty what he had done and why, including the lack of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and therefore lack of any justification to attack Iraq. Therefore, every single person who voted for George Bush in the 2004 is, by definition, a murderer and/or accomplice to murder. They're just not willing to get dirty, they'd rather let some poor kid who joined the Army just so he'd get a college education go out and risk his life.
'I wonder, if they do ever come up with a cure for suicide bombers, will they also come up with a cure for arrogant, self-righteous bastards like yourself. One can only hope.'
People believe what they want to believe, I guess. For the original column, see:
Shadowland: The Suicide Solution, 6 September 2005
What if suicide bombing were a disease? Could we find a cure? Some researchers think so.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9230559/site/newsweek/
'Suicide bombers are morally justified in their actions because they seek to destroy only those persons and societies which illegally and unjustly repress them. George Bush is a mass murderer. All of those persons who voted for George Bush in the 2004 election knew with full certainty what he had done and why, including the lack of any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and therefore lack of any justification to attack Iraq. Therefore, every single person who voted for George Bush in the 2004 is, by definition, a murderer and/or accomplice to murder. They're just not willing to get dirty, they'd rather let some poor kid who joined the Army just so he'd get a college education go out and risk his life.
'I wonder, if they do ever come up with a cure for suicide bombers, will they also come up with a cure for arrogant, self-righteous bastards like yourself. One can only hope.'
People believe what they want to believe, I guess. For the original column, see:
Shadowland: The Suicide Solution, 6 September 2005
What if suicide bombing were a disease? Could we find a cure? Some researchers think so.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9230559/site/newsweek/
The Search for Expert Experts
In this latest missive from my Saudi friend (now enjoying Ramadan in California), he asks, "Are American experts lost?" and argues against the assertion of certainty where none exists:
'When it comes to expert opinion, we have heard just about everything over the past few years: the US economy in full recovery or nearing collapse; a stable $35 barrel of oil or one certain to head above $100; a war in Iraq based on WMD certainties and assured of rapid success or a war justified by innuendo and certain to spread havoc across the Middle East. These are only some examples of expert opinions of those in the know, circulated daily in the American media.
'The cast of characters usually includes those respectable experts from investment houses who, in their grey suits and with unmatched confidence, list their incontrovertible reasons why the US economy is on a full recovery. There are the morally unquestionable reporters, from conservative or liberal newspapers, who deliver compelling inside information removing all doubt that Saddam Hussein is fully armed with WMD and even making plans to use them in attacking the United States. Finally, there are those attractive and very blonde presenters who are able to convince us about anything from the likely outcome of an American football game to the future direction of the stock market....
'It is a mystery how almost every single economic commentator or analyst could continue telling the American public that their economy is doing great and that growth will continue to improve, when they know that this growth is based on an ever more untenable and growing national debt. How could the head of a household truthfully tell his family that they are doing great and will continue to prosper, when he knows that he is unable to repay those he continues to borrow from to keep his house afloat? ...
'These so-called experts exist not only in the United States, but also in Saudi Arabia where God knows how some come up with their predictions on the future of the oil market. Whether they represent vested interests or important clients is a question that must seriously be asked. ...
'The media are competing to attract our attention rather than to add to our knowledge, and government and business interests seem to be taking full advantage of this. Whether it be the mess in Iraq, our unpreparedness in the oil market, or the trials and tribulations of the economy, the experts have only added to the confusion.
'I wonder where that rare expert is who has the wisdom and the nobility to sometimes say that we really cannot know or be sure. Such qualities may be rare, but they are essential in any expert. It seems that, except for a rare few, such experts do not survive for long in the current media environment. We flip channels and see the same pre-packaged experts whose goal it is to keep us happy and to turn us into clones for the benefit of certain interests. We have entered a dangerous blind spot of spin, hype, and real disinformation.
'I may be no expert myself on some of these topics, but I don’t pretend to be one and I can smell a fish when I come across one. The official “experts” who crowd our daily lives have already succeeded in discrediting themselves, be it through their comments on the presence of WMD in Iraq or their chipper predictions for the US economy and the future of the oil market. We must not fall for this and we must make sure that there remains a wide enough access to more modest experts and more objective assessments.'
'When it comes to expert opinion, we have heard just about everything over the past few years: the US economy in full recovery or nearing collapse; a stable $35 barrel of oil or one certain to head above $100; a war in Iraq based on WMD certainties and assured of rapid success or a war justified by innuendo and certain to spread havoc across the Middle East. These are only some examples of expert opinions of those in the know, circulated daily in the American media.
'The cast of characters usually includes those respectable experts from investment houses who, in their grey suits and with unmatched confidence, list their incontrovertible reasons why the US economy is on a full recovery. There are the morally unquestionable reporters, from conservative or liberal newspapers, who deliver compelling inside information removing all doubt that Saddam Hussein is fully armed with WMD and even making plans to use them in attacking the United States. Finally, there are those attractive and very blonde presenters who are able to convince us about anything from the likely outcome of an American football game to the future direction of the stock market....
'It is a mystery how almost every single economic commentator or analyst could continue telling the American public that their economy is doing great and that growth will continue to improve, when they know that this growth is based on an ever more untenable and growing national debt. How could the head of a household truthfully tell his family that they are doing great and will continue to prosper, when he knows that he is unable to repay those he continues to borrow from to keep his house afloat? ...
'These so-called experts exist not only in the United States, but also in Saudi Arabia where God knows how some come up with their predictions on the future of the oil market. Whether they represent vested interests or important clients is a question that must seriously be asked. ...
'The media are competing to attract our attention rather than to add to our knowledge, and government and business interests seem to be taking full advantage of this. Whether it be the mess in Iraq, our unpreparedness in the oil market, or the trials and tribulations of the economy, the experts have only added to the confusion.
'I wonder where that rare expert is who has the wisdom and the nobility to sometimes say that we really cannot know or be sure. Such qualities may be rare, but they are essential in any expert. It seems that, except for a rare few, such experts do not survive for long in the current media environment. We flip channels and see the same pre-packaged experts whose goal it is to keep us happy and to turn us into clones for the benefit of certain interests. We have entered a dangerous blind spot of spin, hype, and real disinformation.
'I may be no expert myself on some of these topics, but I don’t pretend to be one and I can smell a fish when I come across one. The official “experts” who crowd our daily lives have already succeeded in discrediting themselves, be it through their comments on the presence of WMD in Iraq or their chipper predictions for the US economy and the future of the oil market. We must not fall for this and we must make sure that there remains a wide enough access to more modest experts and more objective assessments.'
Sunday, October 09, 2005
Travel: Michael Allin's Alex
Michael Allin and I have been friends since long ago and far away when I was at the beginning of my teens and he was at the end of his. He went on to become a screenwriter ("Enter the Dragon") and novelist ("The Christmas Kid"), but found his real metier as a poet-traveler-historian with the book "Zarafa," about a giraffe given by the Pasha of Egypt to the King of France in the early 19th century. Michael retraced the journey of this wild animal with whom everyone seemed to fall in love as she made her way from Sudan up the Nile to Alexandria, across the Mediterranean to Marseilles, and was then walked through France to the Jardin des Plantes in Paris: history as fable, travel as literature. Michael has since wandered along the remotest recesses of the Silk Road, is now exploring South America, and occasionally shares his writing with us on his blog:
"Leaving Africa, from my book ZARAFA:
"At Alexandria the sea is ever changing -- turquoise shallows and purple depths and vast outer blue that turns dark green when the wind roughens it too choppy to reflect the sky, silver gray under clouds and patched with golden columns of sunlight -- constant only in its immensity and, after the snaking current of the Nile, violently alive. Incoming swells explode into rainbows against the limestone fortress of the Mamelukes at the entrance to the harbor. The light, too, is mercurial, moody without the solid heat of the desert. Arabic sounds different here, and faces change as Egypt turns Greek.
"After the overwhelming fact of the Nile -- where the heat and the landscape and fifty centuries of history confirm the irrelevance of any particular life -- Alexandria is a physical and emotional relief, a beautiful and confusing letdown. Body and eyes no longer suffer, and the mind no longer searches in awe for the shelter of a detail -- momentary shade, a drink, some small living touch like the green monkey climbing that other Zarafa's neck [painted in a tomb at Luxor] 3,500 years ago. ..."
"Leaving Africa, from my book ZARAFA:
"At Alexandria the sea is ever changing -- turquoise shallows and purple depths and vast outer blue that turns dark green when the wind roughens it too choppy to reflect the sky, silver gray under clouds and patched with golden columns of sunlight -- constant only in its immensity and, after the snaking current of the Nile, violently alive. Incoming swells explode into rainbows against the limestone fortress of the Mamelukes at the entrance to the harbor. The light, too, is mercurial, moody without the solid heat of the desert. Arabic sounds different here, and faces change as Egypt turns Greek.
"After the overwhelming fact of the Nile -- where the heat and the landscape and fifty centuries of history confirm the irrelevance of any particular life -- Alexandria is a physical and emotional relief, a beautiful and confusing letdown. Body and eyes no longer suffer, and the mind no longer searches in awe for the shelter of a detail -- momentary shade, a drink, some small living touch like the green monkey climbing that other Zarafa's neck [painted in a tomb at Luxor] 3,500 years ago. ..."
Soldier Blog: Sisyphus Today
Sisyphus Today: The Metaphor
"The IED that caused that crater would have taken out my side of the truck and me along with it. But strangely, I had no real reaction to that consideration; no fear, no shock, no feeling of fortune. Nothing except the idea that it signified something.
"It only took me a few more moments to realize what that was. As we were snaking our way through the tight, bush-lined corridor toward the Tigris bridge, I came to understand that the IED blast was a specific, destructive event that had left lasting effects.
"The metaphor began...."
I don't know anything this soldier Dean M. Dorman apart from what's on his blog, but I've got to be intrigued by its too-appropriate title, his chilled prose, and the fact that he lists two works by Aldous Huxley among his three favorite books. I sometimes take an old copy of Huxley's collected essays with me when I travel. "The Doors of Perception" is a fascinating pre-Sixties look at psychedelia. But one of the pieces I find most useful is the essay called "Usually Destroyed." For more on this point, see:
Shadowland: Out of Balance, 5 Jan 2005
The world rarely takes notice of disasters and wars until they cross a mind-boggling threshold of pain. Are Americans starting to feel the same way about U.S. soldiers dying in Iraq? http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6786899/site/newsweek/
"The IED that caused that crater would have taken out my side of the truck and me along with it. But strangely, I had no real reaction to that consideration; no fear, no shock, no feeling of fortune. Nothing except the idea that it signified something.
"It only took me a few more moments to realize what that was. As we were snaking our way through the tight, bush-lined corridor toward the Tigris bridge, I came to understand that the IED blast was a specific, destructive event that had left lasting effects.
"The metaphor began...."
I don't know anything this soldier Dean M. Dorman apart from what's on his blog, but I've got to be intrigued by its too-appropriate title, his chilled prose, and the fact that he lists two works by Aldous Huxley among his three favorite books. I sometimes take an old copy of Huxley's collected essays with me when I travel. "The Doors of Perception" is a fascinating pre-Sixties look at psychedelia. But one of the pieces I find most useful is the essay called "Usually Destroyed." For more on this point, see:
Shadowland: Out of Balance, 5 Jan 2005
The world rarely takes notice of disasters and wars until they cross a mind-boggling threshold of pain. Are Americans starting to feel the same way about U.S. soldiers dying in Iraq? http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6786899/site/newsweek/
Newsweek Article: Kurdish Complications
Friends in the Mountains
Northern Iraq is a stable land where people love America and Americans. So why doesn't the U.S. military make itself at home?
By Babak Dehghanpisheh and Christopher Dickey, with Owen Matthews in Baghdad, Scott Johnson in Haro, Michael Hastings in Mosul, John Barry and Michael Hirsh in Washington, and Sami Kohen in Istanbul
Oct. 17, 2005 issue - For a brief spell last year, small groups of American soldiers fresh off the battlefields of Fallujah and Samarra got a chance to rest and relax at the Jiyan Hotel in the highlands of Iraq. They could swim laps, play tennis, shoot pool and generally just chill as they looked out on the dramatic snow-covered peaks that have always been the refuge of the Kurds. ("We have no friends but the mountains" is a well-known Kurdish proverb.) Kids mobbed the soldiers, asking for candy; adults began every conversation with "My friend." Indeed, there are few places anywhere in the world these days where American troops get a warmer welcome.
When you hear that Iraqis are sick of the U.S. occupation, remember the Kurds. They love the U.S.A. They want these American occupiers, and really do think of them as liberators. Top Kurdish officials have practically begged the U.S. military to make itself at home in their land. "I do not ask that Americans build bases in Kurdistan—I demand it," says Abdel Beg Perwani, a Kurdish member of Iraq's Parliament and deputy head of the defense committee....
Question of the moment: When you've read the whole article, I'd be interested to know how close you think the United States should get to the Kurds.
Northern Iraq is a stable land where people love America and Americans. So why doesn't the U.S. military make itself at home?
By Babak Dehghanpisheh and Christopher Dickey, with Owen Matthews in Baghdad, Scott Johnson in Haro, Michael Hastings in Mosul, John Barry and Michael Hirsh in Washington, and Sami Kohen in Istanbul
Oct. 17, 2005 issue - For a brief spell last year, small groups of American soldiers fresh off the battlefields of Fallujah and Samarra got a chance to rest and relax at the Jiyan Hotel in the highlands of Iraq. They could swim laps, play tennis, shoot pool and generally just chill as they looked out on the dramatic snow-covered peaks that have always been the refuge of the Kurds. ("We have no friends but the mountains" is a well-known Kurdish proverb.) Kids mobbed the soldiers, asking for candy; adults began every conversation with "My friend." Indeed, there are few places anywhere in the world these days where American troops get a warmer welcome.
When you hear that Iraqis are sick of the U.S. occupation, remember the Kurds. They love the U.S.A. They want these American occupiers, and really do think of them as liberators. Top Kurdish officials have practically begged the U.S. military to make itself at home in their land. "I do not ask that Americans build bases in Kurdistan—I demand it," says Abdel Beg Perwani, a Kurdish member of Iraq's Parliament and deputy head of the defense committee....
Question of the moment: When you've read the whole article, I'd be interested to know how close you think the United States should get to the Kurds.
Audio on Iraq: Dickey, Zakaria, Packer
Audio: Are Kurds in Control of Iraq?
Newsweek On Air
Oct. 9, 2005 - Guests: Christopher Dickey, NEWSWEEK Paris Bureau Chief/Mid-East Regional Editor; Fareed Zakaria, Editor of NEWSWEEK International Editions and Host of Foreign Exchange (PBS); and George Packer, New Yorker Staff Writer, author of “The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq.”
Also available as a podcast from Newsweek.
Newsweek On Air
Oct. 9, 2005 - Guests: Christopher Dickey, NEWSWEEK Paris Bureau Chief/Mid-East Regional Editor; Fareed Zakaria, Editor of NEWSWEEK International Editions and Host of Foreign Exchange (PBS); and George Packer, New Yorker Staff Writer, author of “The Assassins’ Gate: America in Iraq.”
Also available as a podcast from Newsweek.
Saturday, October 08, 2005
Terror: Crying Wolf, Playing Politics
The War in Context tracks breaking news and adds thoughtful perspective. Along with the David Goldenberg post, it raises some critical questions that ought to concern all of us:
Al Qaeda tells ally in Iraq to strive for global goals
By Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, New York Times, October 7, 2005
The second-ranking leader of Al Qaeda has warned the top militant in Iraq that attacks on civilians and videotaped executions committed by his followers threaten to jeopardize the broader extremist cause, a senior United States official said Thursday.The warning, from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was spelled out in a 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, that was obtained by American forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Iraq, the official said in a briefing.Mr. Zawahiri said that Iraq had become "the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era," but that Mr. Zarqawi's forces should keep in mind that it was only a stepping stone toward a broader victory for militant Islam across the Middle East."The mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal," Mr. Zawahiri said in the letter, according to a partial translation provided by the official, who declined to provide verbatim translations of anything more than three sentences from the document. Under the ground rules for the briefing, the official cannot be identified. [complete article]
Comment -- Do al Qaeda and the Bush administration now have a coordinated communications strategy? I'd have to say that it was a stunning stroke of luck that the Zawahiri treatise came to light the same day that President Bush gave his "major" address on the war on terror. But no! The NYT's stalwart reporters inform us that "the official said the decision to disclose the letter was made independently of the speech." Who could doubt his word?Supposedly we're only being told about the letter's existence because the story had already been leaked to CBS and NBC - this, during the same week that we learned that a suspected spy was working in Dick Cheney's office. Of course in this case the fact that the story was "leaked" is not meant to imply that al Qaeda might have a mole in the White House. It does however beg the question as to how any responsible reporters would blithely repeat the assertion that the release of this news had nothing to do with Bush's speech.
Al Qaeda tells ally in Iraq to strive for global goals
By Douglas Jehl and Thom Shanker, New York Times, October 7, 2005
The second-ranking leader of Al Qaeda has warned the top militant in Iraq that attacks on civilians and videotaped executions committed by his followers threaten to jeopardize the broader extremist cause, a senior United States official said Thursday.The warning, from Ayman al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was spelled out in a 6,000-word letter, dated early in July, that was obtained by American forces conducting counterterrorism operations in Iraq, the official said in a briefing.Mr. Zawahiri said that Iraq had become "the place for the greatest battle of Islam in this era," but that Mr. Zarqawi's forces should keep in mind that it was only a stepping stone toward a broader victory for militant Islam across the Middle East."The mujahedeen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal," Mr. Zawahiri said in the letter, according to a partial translation provided by the official, who declined to provide verbatim translations of anything more than three sentences from the document. Under the ground rules for the briefing, the official cannot be identified. [complete article]
Comment -- Do al Qaeda and the Bush administration now have a coordinated communications strategy? I'd have to say that it was a stunning stroke of luck that the Zawahiri treatise came to light the same day that President Bush gave his "major" address on the war on terror. But no! The NYT's stalwart reporters inform us that "the official said the decision to disclose the letter was made independently of the speech." Who could doubt his word?Supposedly we're only being told about the letter's existence because the story had already been leaked to CBS and NBC - this, during the same week that we learned that a suspected spy was working in Dick Cheney's office. Of course in this case the fact that the story was "leaked" is not meant to imply that al Qaeda might have a mole in the White House. It does however beg the question as to how any responsible reporters would blithely repeat the assertion that the release of this news had nothing to do with Bush's speech.
My buddy of many years David Goldenberg, who's found his real vocation in blogging, nailed something that had been bothering me but I hadn't had time to write about:
October 6, 2005
Two Minds with but a Single Thought
A nation of sheep will beget a government of wolves.—Edward R Murrow
Bush’s ratings in the polls stink. He gives a speech saying Iraq is the answer to fighting worldwide terrorism to try to bolster some kind of support. Mayor Bloomberg of New York is having political difficulties as he faces re-election. He “had been invited to appear at a mayoral debate Thursday evening, but declined -- a decision that has brought him considerable criticism.”What’s the quickest way to create a diversion and make leadership look solid and in control?
New York City's subway system was put under heightened alert Thursday after officials received information from the FBI about a "specific threat," Mayor Michael Bloomberg said.—CNN
And to help with the Iraq connection:
A law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the threat was “specific to place, time and method,” which was a bombing. The official said the information resulted from the arrest of al-Qaida operatives in Iraq.—MSNBC
But there is a soft underbelly to this fearmongering:
The Department of Homeland Security said the intelligence community believes the information is of "doubtful" credibility.—Newsday
It’s not as if this scare is a total loss—there is still the undercurrent in the media about bird flu pandemic, which could kill millions. Don’t think Bush hasn’t got some ideas about how to fight bird flu:
A call by President George W. Bush for Congress to give him the power to use the military in law enforcement roles in the event of a bird flu pandemic has been criticized as akin to introducing martial law.Bush said aggressive action would be needed to prevent a potentiallydisastrous U.S. outbreak of the disease that is sweeping through Asian poultry and which experts fear could mutate to pass between humans.—CNN, Bush military bird flu role slammed
What this country needs is a calming assurance from our leaders that will let us all sleep better and build our immune systems so we won’t be so susceptible to all these viruses—and work for common goals, instead of constantly playing “duck and cover.”
That takes courageous leadership, because the consequence of a fearful populace is an easily led one, like sheep, which helps if you’re a fearful leader.
This kind of thing greatly increases the danger that just when the sheep really do need to listen, they'll think their government is crying wolf. - CD
See:
Essential Emmes
October 6, 2005
Two Minds with but a Single Thought
A nation of sheep will beget a government of wolves.—Edward R Murrow
Bush’s ratings in the polls stink. He gives a speech saying Iraq is the answer to fighting worldwide terrorism to try to bolster some kind of support. Mayor Bloomberg of New York is having political difficulties as he faces re-election. He “had been invited to appear at a mayoral debate Thursday evening, but declined -- a decision that has brought him considerable criticism.”What’s the quickest way to create a diversion and make leadership look solid and in control?
New York City's subway system was put under heightened alert Thursday after officials received information from the FBI about a "specific threat," Mayor Michael Bloomberg said.—CNN
And to help with the Iraq connection:
A law enforcement official who spoke on condition of anonymity said the threat was “specific to place, time and method,” which was a bombing. The official said the information resulted from the arrest of al-Qaida operatives in Iraq.—MSNBC
But there is a soft underbelly to this fearmongering:
The Department of Homeland Security said the intelligence community believes the information is of "doubtful" credibility.—Newsday
It’s not as if this scare is a total loss—there is still the undercurrent in the media about bird flu pandemic, which could kill millions. Don’t think Bush hasn’t got some ideas about how to fight bird flu:
A call by President George W. Bush for Congress to give him the power to use the military in law enforcement roles in the event of a bird flu pandemic has been criticized as akin to introducing martial law.Bush said aggressive action would be needed to prevent a potentiallydisastrous U.S. outbreak of the disease that is sweeping through Asian poultry and which experts fear could mutate to pass between humans.—CNN, Bush military bird flu role slammed
What this country needs is a calming assurance from our leaders that will let us all sleep better and build our immune systems so we won’t be so susceptible to all these viruses—and work for common goals, instead of constantly playing “duck and cover.”
That takes courageous leadership, because the consequence of a fearful populace is an easily led one, like sheep, which helps if you’re a fearful leader.
This kind of thing greatly increases the danger that just when the sheep really do need to listen, they'll think their government is crying wolf. - CD
See:
Essential Emmes
Friday, October 07, 2005
Nukes and the Nobel: Where Fuels Rush In
Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, didn't give many interviews over the last few months. One of those, however, was at the beginning of July when I visited him in Vienna. We talked mainly about Iran, but he kept coming back to the more fundamental issue of "the fuel cycle," since a country that can make its own atomic fuel can also make its own fissile material for an atomic bomb. Since we met, Iran has re-started part of the conversion process that turns uranium into fuel, Tehran's talks with Europe have broken down, and after much wrangling the IAEA has opened the possibility it will refer the matter to the UN Security Council (see the September archive on this site). This morning, ElBaradei and the IAEA won the Nobel Peace Prize. Following are some previously unpublished excerpts from the raw transcript of our hour-long conversation last summer:
ElBaradei: I have been saying, not only vis a vis Iran, but also globally, that dissemination of the fuel cycle could be the Achilles heel of the non-proliferation regime. It’s an issue brought to the surface by Iran, but not only Iran. … We know now better than 30 years ago that if you have the fuel cycle you are nuclear-weapons capable, and we need to limit that number. In fact we need to reduce that number and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons capabilities rather than having 30 or 40 countries who can have nuclear weapons [whenever] they change their security perception.
Dickey: That’s what you’ve called “virtual” weapons states.
ElBaradei: "Virtual" weapons states, "closeted" weapons states. Whatever. I’ve tried in many ways to explain it. But you have the fuel cycle, then you are really like six months away from a nuclear weapon. And if I look at it from a global security perspective, well, that is too precarious. We need to reconcile the need for the use of technology and the need to protect ourselves.... I would like to have a system, not only in Iran but everywhere, that is not simply based on trust. I’d like to have a system that is inherently safe. … Can we assure countries that they will have access to the technology without having to have the whole fuel cycle?
Dickey: This is what’s called the fuel bank.
ElBaradei: Yes. ...
Dickey: What do you think Iran wants out of all this?
ElBaradei: Iran wants to get the best from its own perspective. Obviously it wants to get the maximum technology, and not just nuclear. Reactor technology is key for them. They want IT, all the modern technology, Airbus, Boeing. They need the technology to modernize. And I think they understand that the fuel cycle enables them to be part of the big boys club, and it’s a smart insurance policy, if they can get that, because again it sends a message to their neighbors. Iran wants to be a major player in the whole Middle East which is being reshaped right now. …I don’t want to speak for them, but they also would like to normalize their relationship, ultimately, with the US. Their dialogue with Europe is a bridge toward their ultimate normalization with the US. So these are the things that I guess are on their agenda. But I can’t speak for them.
So, again, when you talk about the nuclear program in Iran you are talking about regional politics, regional security – global politics, global security. So, you will have the European agenda, the American agenda, the Iranian agenda, the neighbors agenda, the Israelis, the Arabs. Everybody is affected by how this dialogue between Europe and Iran will play out. I think everybody understands that it is not just the nuclear issue, it is the whole future of the Middle East, it is the whole future of regional security, global security. That’s why it makes it more difficult, and that’s why it takes time, and that’s why people should be patient. As long as they are talking, I’m comfortable. As long as the fuel cycle is suspended, as long as they are making progress, keep at it.
Dickey: The Europeans are sounding very pessimistic these days. It’s very hard to see in the current environment how the Americans are going to offer security guarantees and a face-saving solution for this Iranian regime.
ElBaradei: The number one threat for the entire world is weapons of mass destruction. I’d rather assure our security first, and then I’ll worry about all the other issues: legitimizing regimes, democracy, human rights. If we do not have global security it might be too late to think about any of these issues. So unless I have defanged all the potential proliferators or terrorists or what have you I will not have a chance to discuss these other issues. It’s a question of priorities.
Dickey: What is the risk that talks will collapse and we’ll be looking at a breakout, Iran just walking away from the table and the treaty.
ElBaradei: I am still hoping that at the end of the day, with all the posturing, nobody can afford a confrontation. Confrontation is a lose-lose proposition. … You might see some hiccups in the process, some delays in the process, but I think we need to keep at it.
Dickey: At the end of the day, do you think Iran will become a virtual weapons state?
ElBaradei: [long sigh] What I’m trying to do is put a stop to this madness…
Also see:
Shadowland: Rita's Revelation, 23 Sep 2005
As oil prices soar, so will demands for atomic energy. Iran knows this and Americans should, too. Why it's time to rethink the global approach to nuclear proliferation.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9454837/site/newsweek/
ElBaradei: I have been saying, not only vis a vis Iran, but also globally, that dissemination of the fuel cycle could be the Achilles heel of the non-proliferation regime. It’s an issue brought to the surface by Iran, but not only Iran. … We know now better than 30 years ago that if you have the fuel cycle you are nuclear-weapons capable, and we need to limit that number. In fact we need to reduce that number and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons capabilities rather than having 30 or 40 countries who can have nuclear weapons [whenever] they change their security perception.
Dickey: That’s what you’ve called “virtual” weapons states.
ElBaradei: "Virtual" weapons states, "closeted" weapons states. Whatever. I’ve tried in many ways to explain it. But you have the fuel cycle, then you are really like six months away from a nuclear weapon. And if I look at it from a global security perspective, well, that is too precarious. We need to reconcile the need for the use of technology and the need to protect ourselves.... I would like to have a system, not only in Iran but everywhere, that is not simply based on trust. I’d like to have a system that is inherently safe. … Can we assure countries that they will have access to the technology without having to have the whole fuel cycle?
Dickey: This is what’s called the fuel bank.
ElBaradei: Yes. ...
Dickey: What do you think Iran wants out of all this?
ElBaradei: Iran wants to get the best from its own perspective. Obviously it wants to get the maximum technology, and not just nuclear. Reactor technology is key for them. They want IT, all the modern technology, Airbus, Boeing. They need the technology to modernize. And I think they understand that the fuel cycle enables them to be part of the big boys club, and it’s a smart insurance policy, if they can get that, because again it sends a message to their neighbors. Iran wants to be a major player in the whole Middle East which is being reshaped right now. …I don’t want to speak for them, but they also would like to normalize their relationship, ultimately, with the US. Their dialogue with Europe is a bridge toward their ultimate normalization with the US. So these are the things that I guess are on their agenda. But I can’t speak for them.
So, again, when you talk about the nuclear program in Iran you are talking about regional politics, regional security – global politics, global security. So, you will have the European agenda, the American agenda, the Iranian agenda, the neighbors agenda, the Israelis, the Arabs. Everybody is affected by how this dialogue between Europe and Iran will play out. I think everybody understands that it is not just the nuclear issue, it is the whole future of the Middle East, it is the whole future of regional security, global security. That’s why it makes it more difficult, and that’s why it takes time, and that’s why people should be patient. As long as they are talking, I’m comfortable. As long as the fuel cycle is suspended, as long as they are making progress, keep at it.
Dickey: The Europeans are sounding very pessimistic these days. It’s very hard to see in the current environment how the Americans are going to offer security guarantees and a face-saving solution for this Iranian regime.
ElBaradei: The number one threat for the entire world is weapons of mass destruction. I’d rather assure our security first, and then I’ll worry about all the other issues: legitimizing regimes, democracy, human rights. If we do not have global security it might be too late to think about any of these issues. So unless I have defanged all the potential proliferators or terrorists or what have you I will not have a chance to discuss these other issues. It’s a question of priorities.
Dickey: What is the risk that talks will collapse and we’ll be looking at a breakout, Iran just walking away from the table and the treaty.
ElBaradei: I am still hoping that at the end of the day, with all the posturing, nobody can afford a confrontation. Confrontation is a lose-lose proposition. … You might see some hiccups in the process, some delays in the process, but I think we need to keep at it.
Dickey: At the end of the day, do you think Iran will become a virtual weapons state?
ElBaradei: [long sigh] What I’m trying to do is put a stop to this madness…
Also see:
Shadowland: Rita's Revelation, 23 Sep 2005
As oil prices soar, so will demands for atomic energy. Iran knows this and Americans should, too. Why it's time to rethink the global approach to nuclear proliferation.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9454837/site/newsweek/
BBC: White House Denies Divine Mission
I'm sure we're all relieved by this news from London:
'The White House has dismissed as "absurd" allegations made in a BBC TV series that President Bush claimed God told him to invade Iraq.
"He's never made such comments," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said.
The comments were attributed to Mr Bush by the Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath in the upcoming TV series Israel and the Arabs: Elusive Peace.
Mr Shaath said that in a 2003 meeting with Mr Bush, the US president said he was "driven with a mission from God".
"President Bush said to all of us: 'I'm driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, George, go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan. And I did, and then God would tell me, George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq... And I did.
"'And now, again, I feel God's words coming to me, Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East. And by God I'm gonna do it.'"...'
Anybody who's grown up in the South would know right away from the president's syntax and style, that wasn't God speaking, it was just the good ol' boy in George. - CD
'The White House has dismissed as "absurd" allegations made in a BBC TV series that President Bush claimed God told him to invade Iraq.
"He's never made such comments," White House spokesman Scott McClellan said.
The comments were attributed to Mr Bush by the Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath in the upcoming TV series Israel and the Arabs: Elusive Peace.
Mr Shaath said that in a 2003 meeting with Mr Bush, the US president said he was "driven with a mission from God".
"President Bush said to all of us: 'I'm driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, George, go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan. And I did, and then God would tell me, George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq... And I did.
"'And now, again, I feel God's words coming to me, Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East. And by God I'm gonna do it.'"...'
Anybody who's grown up in the South would know right away from the president's syntax and style, that wasn't God speaking, it was just the good ol' boy in George. - CD
Question of the moment: If you believe in God, whose side do you believe the Almighty has taken?
James Dickey: Firebombings Then and Now
Shawn Pittard of The Great American Pinup has weighed in with the final of three superb essays looking at my father's experience in World War II and how he transformed it into fiction and poetry:
“The sound of the crowd around me was made up of high yells, all you could put up with, but around them all was the low sound, which must have been coming from the whole city. How all those high screams could have added up to that one low tone, like a glacier when it first begins to calve off, was not something I could explain.”
Almost thirty years after writing “The Firebombing,” James Dickey revisited the subject in his novel To the White Sea (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993). This time, he put an American airman on the ground during the firebombing of Tokyo. We see the chaos, panic, and the intense-heat of a white phosphorus-and-gasoline fire through Sergeant Muldrow’s eyes.
“It was so hot that I kept looking at the arms of the coat I had on to see when they’d take fire. And then it got hotter, goddamn it, and hotter than that. I didn’t think my clothes would catch; I didn’t think that anymore then. I thought I would take fire myself, inside the clothes, and that the clothes, shoes and all, would burn up after I did.”
Also see:
Firebombings: From My Father's Wars to Mine, a lecture I gave at Clemson University, 19 Nov 2003 (PDF), and "Summer of Deliverance: A Memoir of Father and Son."
“The sound of the crowd around me was made up of high yells, all you could put up with, but around them all was the low sound, which must have been coming from the whole city. How all those high screams could have added up to that one low tone, like a glacier when it first begins to calve off, was not something I could explain.”
Almost thirty years after writing “The Firebombing,” James Dickey revisited the subject in his novel To the White Sea (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993). This time, he put an American airman on the ground during the firebombing of Tokyo. We see the chaos, panic, and the intense-heat of a white phosphorus-and-gasoline fire through Sergeant Muldrow’s eyes.
“It was so hot that I kept looking at the arms of the coat I had on to see when they’d take fire. And then it got hotter, goddamn it, and hotter than that. I didn’t think my clothes would catch; I didn’t think that anymore then. I thought I would take fire myself, inside the clothes, and that the clothes, shoes and all, would burn up after I did.”
Also see:
Firebombings: From My Father's Wars to Mine, a lecture I gave at Clemson University, 19 Nov 2003 (PDF), and "Summer of Deliverance: A Memoir of Father and Son."
Bush: An Essential Contradiction
President George W. Bush's attempt yesterday to make his Global War on Terror the moral and military equivalent of the Cold War against the Soviet Union was less than convincing, I think, for anyone who remembers the basic threat of that bygone age: the extermination of all life on the planet. By comparison, subway bombings and even 9/11 are relatively minor concerns. As usual, the administration is playing the terrorist's game, inflating Osama Bin Laden's reputation by likening him to Stalin, describing Al Qaeda's ideology as if it were not just a security problem but an existential threat to the West. He described the terrorists' agenda as if it should be setting ours. A real mistake. Bush is playing politics, of course. He wanted to put Hurricane Katrina behind us and get back to the war president image that used to work so well for him. He wanted to justify Iraq by linking it, as ever, to Osama. But the fundamental contradiction in his approach was evident in the text of the speech:
"Some have also argued that extremism has been strengthened by the actions of our coalition in Iraq, claiming that our presence in that country has somehow caused or triggered the rage of radicals. I would remind them that we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001 -- and al Qaeda attacked us anyway," said the president, which is true, as far as it goes. But a few paragraphs later, Bush boasts that with the help of other governments "we've killed or captured nearly all of those directly responsible for the September the 11th attacks." What he fails to mention is that not one of those terrorists was caught in Iraq, and the great majority were nabbed before the invasion. The threat we face now, such as it is, comes from a new generation of terrorists directly inspired by the Iraq war, and, oh yes, from Osama, the one who got away. - CD
Also see:
Newsweek Article: Jihad Express, 13 Mar 2005
For Islamic militants in Europe, Iraq far outshines Afghanistan as an urban-terrorism training ground. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7169294/site/newsweek/
Shadowland: When Victory Was Ours, 25 September 2003
Nine months ago, Saddam Hussein was contained and Al Qaeda was on the run. But that just wasn’t enough for the Bush administration. No wonder readers are upset
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3087087/
"Some have also argued that extremism has been strengthened by the actions of our coalition in Iraq, claiming that our presence in that country has somehow caused or triggered the rage of radicals. I would remind them that we were not in Iraq on September the 11th, 2001 -- and al Qaeda attacked us anyway," said the president, which is true, as far as it goes. But a few paragraphs later, Bush boasts that with the help of other governments "we've killed or captured nearly all of those directly responsible for the September the 11th attacks." What he fails to mention is that not one of those terrorists was caught in Iraq, and the great majority were nabbed before the invasion. The threat we face now, such as it is, comes from a new generation of terrorists directly inspired by the Iraq war, and, oh yes, from Osama, the one who got away. - CD
Also see:
Newsweek Article: Jihad Express, 13 Mar 2005
For Islamic militants in Europe, Iraq far outshines Afghanistan as an urban-terrorism training ground. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7169294/site/newsweek/
Shadowland: When Victory Was Ours, 25 September 2003
Nine months ago, Saddam Hussein was contained and Al Qaeda was on the run. But that just wasn’t enough for the Bush administration. No wonder readers are upset
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3087087/
Should the Generals Resign?
The latest post from Col. W. Patrick Lang, a retired officer of U.S. Military Intelligence and the U.S. Army Special Forces who is a voice of reason on military and political events in the Middle East, from his blog Sic Semper Tyrannis 2005:
Is The Military Upset With Me?
Someone asked me if I experience hostility from the US military (active or retired).
The answer is no, not so far. I had a college classmate (a retired officer) write to me early in the Iraq War to say that my presumption in writing on this subject reflected his memory of me as a "smart ass," and that his present (then) employment as a consultant for a DoD contractor company providing hot meals for the troops should make me more sensitive of the fragility of his warlike feelings and morale. Touching.
There a lot of generals out there who are scared silly of Rumsfeld and Bush and would never talk to me in pyblic for fear that Rummy might find out. Warriors? A lot of them are reading this now. My father was a tough old soldier, rather like one of the senior sergeants in "From Here to Eternity." He retired as an officer, but in his heart he was always a sergeant major. He told me often that whenever I might be tempted to trust a general officer I should remember how he "got to be one." There are generals whom I admire. You know who you are, but the craven behavior of present day generals is depressing. Why has no one resigned in the face of stupidity on both the strategic and tactical level? Why?
There are a lot of people out there in "cloud cuckoo land" who would like to "turn Iraq into a glassy parking lot." That would work, but we are not going to do that. The American people will not allow that. That being the case, let us all think positively about solutions for this awful dillemma that we have made for ourselves. Above all, remember that "Specialist Snuffy Smith" of the Arkansas National Guard or "Lance Corporal Jones" of the 1st Marine Regiment were sent there by the government that we elected. They did not pick this war or this enemy and they only volunteered once, when they joined up.
Having said this, I should expect nastiness in the mail. I do
Pat Lang
Is The Military Upset With Me?
Someone asked me if I experience hostility from the US military (active or retired).
The answer is no, not so far. I had a college classmate (a retired officer) write to me early in the Iraq War to say that my presumption in writing on this subject reflected his memory of me as a "smart ass," and that his present (then) employment as a consultant for a DoD contractor company providing hot meals for the troops should make me more sensitive of the fragility of his warlike feelings and morale. Touching.
There a lot of generals out there who are scared silly of Rumsfeld and Bush and would never talk to me in pyblic for fear that Rummy might find out. Warriors? A lot of them are reading this now. My father was a tough old soldier, rather like one of the senior sergeants in "From Here to Eternity." He retired as an officer, but in his heart he was always a sergeant major. He told me often that whenever I might be tempted to trust a general officer I should remember how he "got to be one." There are generals whom I admire. You know who you are, but the craven behavior of present day generals is depressing. Why has no one resigned in the face of stupidity on both the strategic and tactical level? Why?
There are a lot of people out there in "cloud cuckoo land" who would like to "turn Iraq into a glassy parking lot." That would work, but we are not going to do that. The American people will not allow that. That being the case, let us all think positively about solutions for this awful dillemma that we have made for ourselves. Above all, remember that "Specialist Snuffy Smith" of the Arkansas National Guard or "Lance Corporal Jones" of the 1st Marine Regiment were sent there by the government that we elected. They did not pick this war or this enemy and they only volunteered once, when they joined up.
Having said this, I should expect nastiness in the mail. I do
Pat Lang
Thursday, October 06, 2005
Time to Lie Low
This from my old friend Andrew Sussman, who's lived in many exotic Muslim lands, and now practices law in exotic Southern California:
Late next week, Yom Kippur and the 9th or 10th day of Ramadan occur on the same day. On that day, all the world's observant Muslims and Jews will be hungry, thirsty, horny, crabby and generally on edge. I predict that it'll be a good day to keep a low profile.
Late next week, Yom Kippur and the 9th or 10th day of Ramadan occur on the same day. On that day, all the world's observant Muslims and Jews will be hungry, thirsty, horny, crabby and generally on edge. I predict that it'll be a good day to keep a low profile.
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