Following is the summary of the so-called "Bin Laden" documents just released by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. The original documents and English translations can be downloaded as PDFs form the CTC site here.
Some analysts suggest the documents are being released now to sow discord among Al Qaeda affiliates. The CTC's own headline is "Letters from Abottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?"
Perhaps. But as it happens several of the key figures replacing OBL are now dead, too, so their ambitions and rivalries would seem to be a moot point.
Some, like Anwar al-Awlaki, became jihadi idols, briefly, before the Obama administration blew them up. Others, like the leaders of Al-Shabab in Somalia, seem never to have been able to win OBL's respect. But one of the most interesting and important, Atiyya, preferred to keep a very low profile until a drone strike reportedly took him out in August last year. Will McCants wrote a very useful portrait of Atiyya and his importance on the Foreign Affairs site soon afterwards. It can be found here.
Description
of the Abbottabad Documents Provided to the CTC
This
document provides a general description of the 17 declassified documents captured
in the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC). For additional context please see the
documents themselves and/or the CTC’s report “Letters from Abbottabad: Bin
Ladin Sidelined?” released in conjunction with this summary.
The
17 documents consist of electronic letters or draft letters, totaling 175 pages
in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation. The earliest letter
is dated September 2006 and the latest April 2011. These internal al-Qa`ida
communications were authored by several
leaders, including Usama bin Ladin, `Atiyya
`Abd
al-Rahman, Abu Yahya al-Libi and the American Adam Gadahn, as well as several
unknown individuals who were either affiliated with the group or wrote to offer
it advice. Other recognizable personalities who feature in the letters either
as authors, recipients or points of conversation include Mukhtar Abu al-Zubayr,
leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin; Nasir al-Wuhayshi
(Abu Basir), leader of the Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP); Anwar al-`Awlaqi; and
Hakimullah Mahsud, leader of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Some of the
letters are incomplete and/or are missing their dates, and not all of the
letters explicitly attribute their author(s) and/or indicate to whom they are addressed.
Given that they are all electronic documents either saved on thumb drives,
memory cards or the hard drive of Bin Ladin’s computer, except for the letters
addressed to Bin Ladin, it cannot be ascertained whether any of these letters actually
reached their intended destinations.
SOCOM-2012-0000003
This
letter was authored by Usama bin Ladin and addressed to Shaykh Mahmud (`Atiyya Abdul Rahman) on 27
August 2010. Mahmud is specifically directed to tell “Basir,” who is Nasir al-Wuhayshi
(Abu Basir), the leader of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula, to remain in his
role (presumably in response to a request from Abu Basir that Anwar al-`Awlaqi
take his position), and for him to send “us a detailed and lengthy” version of
al-`Awlaqi’s resume. `Atiyya
is
also told to ask Basir and Anwar al-`Awlaqi for their “vision in detail about
the situation” in Yemen. References are also made in the letter to the 2010
floods in Pakistan, a letter from Bin Ladin’s son Khalid to `Abd al-Latif,
al-Qa`ida’s media plan for the 9/11 anniversary, and the need for the “brothers
coming from Iran” to be placed in safe locations.
This
document is a letter authored by the American al-Qa`ida spokesman Adam Gadahn
to an unknown recipient and was written in late January 2011. In the first part
of the document Gadahn provides strategic advice regarding al-Qa`ida’s media
plans for the tenth anniversary of 9/11. The letter is in essence a response to
many of the requests/queries that Bin Ladin makes in his letter to `Atiyya
dated October 2010 (SOCOM-2012-0000015), particularly those concerning a media
strategy for the ten-year anniversary of 9/11. In other parts of the document
Gadahn incisively criticizes the tactics and targeting calculus of the Islamic
State of Iraq (AQI/ISI) and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP); he strongly advocates for al-Qa`ida to publicly dissociate itself
from both groups. The document concludes with a draft statement, which provides
a candid assessment of these issues.
SOCOM-2012-0000005
This
document is a letter dated 7 August 2010 from “Zamarai” (Usama bin Ladin) to Mukhtar Abu
al-Zubayr, the leader of the Somali militant group Harakat al-Shabab
al-Mujahidin, which merged with al-Qa`ida after Bin Ladin’s death. The document
is a response to a letter Bin Ladin received from al-Zubayr in which he requested
formal unity with al-Qa`ida and either consulted Bin Ladin on the question of
declaring an Islamic state in Somalia or informed him that he was about to
declare one. In Bin Ladin’s response, he politely declines al-Shabab’s request
for formal unity with al-Qa`ida.
SOCOM-2012-0000006
This
document is a letter believed to have been composed in December 2010 and its
content relates to SOCOM-2012-0000005.
The letter is addressed to Azmarai, perhaps a typo or misspelling of the
nickname Zamarai (a
nickname or kunya for Bin Ladin). While the identity of the author is unclear, the
familiar tone and implicit critique of Bin Ladin’s policy vis-a-vis al-Shabab
suggest that this is from a high ranking personality, possibly Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Referring to “our friend’s letter” and the perspective of the
“brothers…[who might have been] too concerned about inflating the size and
growth of al-Qa`ida,” the author of the document urges the receiver to
“reconsider your opinion not to declare the accession [i.e. formal merger] of
the brothers of Somalia…” This is clearly a reference to al-Qa`ida’s potential
merger with al-Shabab and suggests that al-Qa`ida’s relationship with the
“affiliates” is a subject of internal debate. If indeed the author of the
letter is Ayman al-Zawahiri this could be an indication of a major fissure over
a key strategic question at the pinnacle of the organization (for different
interpretations of this letter, see Appendix of “Letters from Abbottabad”).
SOCOM-2012-0000007
This
letter is authored by Mahmud al-Hasan (`Atiyya) and
Abu Yahya al-Libi and addressed to the amir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), Hakimullah Mahsud. It is dated 3 December 2010 and is sharply critical
of the ideology and tactics of the TTP.
The letter makes it clear that al-Qa`ida’s senior leaders had serious
concerns about the TTP’s trajectory inside Pakistan, and the impact the group’s
misguided operations might have on al-Qa`ida and other militant groups in the
region. The authors identify several errors committed by the group,
specifically Hakimullah Mahsud’s arrogation of privileges and positions beyond
what was appropriate as the TTP’s amir;
the TTP’s use of indiscriminate violence and killing of Muslim civilians; and
the group’s use of kidnapping. `Atiyya and
al-Libi also take issue with Mahsud labeling al-Qa`ida members as “guests” and the
attempts made by other groups (presumably the TTP) to siphon off al-Qa`ida
members. The authors threaten that if actions are not taken to correct these
mistakes, “we shall be forced to take public
and firm legal steps from our side.”
SOCOM-2012-0000008
This
letter was originally an exchange between Jaysh al-Islam and `Atiyya that was forwarded first
to a certain `Abd al-Hamid (and presumably to Bin Ladin later). The gist of Jaysh al-Islam’s letter
makes it known that the group is in need of financial assistance “to support
jihad,” and that the group is seeking `Atiyya’s legal advice on three matters:
1) the permissibility of accepting financial assistance from other militant
Palestinian groups (e.g., Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad);
2) the permissibility of investing funds in the stock market in
support of jihad; and 3) the permissibility of striking or killing
drug traffickers in order to use their money, and even drugs, to lure their
enemies who could in turn be used by Jaysh al-Islam as double-agents. `Atiyya’s response,
written sometime between 24 October 2006 and 22 November 2006, is cordial but
distant, responding to the questions but refraining from giving any strategic
advice.
SOCOM-2012-0000009
This
document is part of a longer letter which was not released to the CTC. It is
not clear who authored the letter or to whom it was addressed. It discusses the
potential need to change the name of “Qa`idat al-Jihad.” The author is of the
view that the abridging of the name “al-Qa`ida” has “lessened Muslims’ feelings
that we belong to them.” The author is further concerned that since the name
“al-Qa`ida” lacks religious connotations, it has allowed the United States to
launch a war on “al-Qa`ida” without offending Muslims. The author proposed a
list of new names that capture Islamic theological themes: Ta’ifat al-tawhid
wa-al-jihad (Monotheism and Jihad Group), Jama`at wahdat al-Muslimin
(Muslim Unity Group), Hizb tawhid al-Umma al-Islamiyya (Islamic Nation
Unification Party) and Jama`at tahrir al-aqsa (Al-Aqsa Liberation
Group).
SOCOM-2012-0000010
This letter is authored by “Abu `Abdallah”
(Usama bin Ladin), addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) and dated 26 April
2011 – a week before bin Ladin’s death. In it, Bin Ladin outlines his response
to the “Arab Spring,” proposing two different strategies. The first strategy
pertains to the Arab World and entails “inciting people who have not yet
revolted and exhort[ing] them to rebel against the rulers (khuruj ‘ala
al-hukkam)”; the second strategy concerns Afghanistan and it entails
continuing to evoke the obligation of jihad there. The letter also makes
reference to a wide variety of topics including: the scarcity of communications
from Iraq, “the brothers coming from Iran,” and hostages held by “our brothers
in the Islamic Maghreb” and in Somalia. The document also briefly discusses Bin
Ladin’s sons, his courier, Shaykh Abu Muhammad (Ayman al-Zawahiri), and other
individuals of interest.
SOCOM-2012-0000011
This letter, dated 28 March 2007, is
addressed to a legal scholar by the name of Hafiz Sultan, and it is authored by
someone who is of Egyptian origin. The author makes it explicit that he was
alarmed by al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s conduct and he urges Sultan to write to that
group’s leaders to correct their ways. The author also asks for legal guidance
on the use of chlorine gas, which he appears not to support. A reference is also
made to “the brothers in Lebanon” and the need to arrange “to have one of their
representatives visit us in the near future.” A message from the “brothers in
Algeria” is also included.
SOCOM-2012-0000012
This
letter dated 11 June 2009 was written by `Atiyya
to
the “honorable shaykh.” It is possible that it was addressed to Usama bin Ladin,
but it may have been addressed to another senior leader. The majority of the
letter provides details on the release of detained jihadi “brothers” and their
families from Iran and an indication that more are expected to be released,
including Bin Ladin’s family. It seems that their release was partially in
response to covert operations by al-Qa`ida against Iran and its interests.
SOCOM-2012-0000013
This
is a draft that formed the basis of a publicly available document, part four in
a series of statements that Ayman al-Zawahiri released in response to the “Arab
Spring.” Through the document one can observe al-Qa`ida’s editing process
(reflected in the editor’s comments highlighted in green and in a bold font). While
it is not clear if Bin Ladin himself did
the editing, whoever did so has solid grammatical foundations and prefers a more
self-effacing writing style than al-Zawahiri. The edits were not included in
al-Zawahiri’s final speech which was released in a video on 4 March 2011 on
jihadi forums. Of the 12 proposed corrections only one appears in al-Zawahiri’s
speech.
SOCOM-2012-0000014
This
document consists of two letters addressed to “Abu `Abd-al-Rahman,” almost
certainly `Atiyya `Abd
al-Rahman. It was sent by an operative who knows `Atiyya and is a religious
student with ties to the senior shaykhs and clerics in Saudi Arabia. While the
letters are not dated, their contents suggest they were composed soon after January
2007; they read very much like an intelligence assessment, designed to provide `Atiyya with some perspective
on how al-Qa`ida generally, and the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) more
specifically, are perceived amongst Saudi scholars of varying degrees of
prominence. The author provides `Atiyya
with
brief summaries of private meetings the author had with certain scholars, with
the clear intent of evaluating the level of support that al-Qa`ida enjoys from some
relatively prominent members of the Saudi religious establishment.
This
document is a letter dated 21 October 2010 from Bin Ladin to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya). The
letter is primarily focused on issues in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. In
the letter Bin Ladin specifically comments on: the security situation in
Waziristan and the need to relocate al-Qa`ida members from the region; counter surveillance
issues associated with the movement of his son Hamza within Pakistan; the
appointment of `Atiyya’s
three deputies; various al-Sahab videos and
the media plan for the tenth anniversary of 9/11; the release of an Afghan
prisoner held by al-Qa`ida; and the trial of Faisal Shahzad. Ayman al-Zawahiri,
Abu Yahya al-Libi, Saif al-`Adl, and Adam Gadahn are also mentioned in the
document.
This
document is a letter addressed to “Abu Basir” (Nasir al-Wuhayshi, leader of al-Qa`ida
in the Arabian Peninsula - AQAP) from an unidentified author, most likely Usama
bin Ladin and/or `Atiyya. The letter is in part a response to specific requests
for guidance from AQAP’s leadership. The author specifically advises AQAP to
focus on targeting the United States, not the Yemeni government or security
forces. The author also discusses media strategy and the importance of AQAP’s
relations with Yemen’s tribes.
SOCOM-2012-0000017
This
document is a series of paragraphs, some of which match the content found in
SOCOM-2012-0000016. This document was likely written by the author of that
document. This letter discusses strategy, the need for al-Qa`ida to remain focused
on targeting the United States (or even against U.S. targets in South Africa
where other “brothers” are not active), the importance of tribal relations in a
variety of different countries, and media activity.
SOCOM-2012-0000018
This
document is a letter addressed to Usama bin Ladin from “a loving brother whom
you know and who knows you” and dated 14 September 2006. The author is critical
of Bin Ladin for focusing al- Qa`ida’s operations on
“Islamic countries in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular.” He
enumerates the numerous negative consequences of engaging in jihad inside Saudi
Arabia, and informs Bin Ladin that people are now repulsed by the technical
term “jihad” and even forbidden to use it in lectures. The author strongly
advised Bin Ladin to change his policies.
SOCOM-2012-0000019
This
document is a long letter authored by Usama bin Ladin after the death of Sheikh
Sa‘id (Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid) in
late May 2010 and it is addressed to “Shaykh Mahmud” (`Atiyya) who he designates as
Sa‘id’s successor. Bin Ladin’s
letter is concerned with the mistakes committed by regional jihadi groups,
which have resulted in the unnecessary deaths of thousands of Muslim civilians.
Bin Ladin indicates that he would like to start a “new phase” so that the
jihadis could regain the trust of Muslims. He directs `Atiyya to prepare a
memorandum to centralize, in the hands of AQC, the media campaign and
operations of regional jihadi groups. Considerable space is devoted to a
discussion about Yemen, external operations and Bin Ladin’s plans for his son
Hamza. This document includes an additional letter that Bin Ladin forwards to `Atiyya
authored by Shaykh Yunis, presumably Yunis al-Mauritani, consisting of a new
operational plan that al-
Qa`ida should consider adopting.
