TAYSEER ALOUNI: What do you think of the so-called "war of civilizations"? You always keep repeating "crusaders" and words like that all the time. Does that mean you support the war of civilizations?
BIN LADEN: No doubt about that...
Al Jazeera television correspondent Tayseer Alouni was convicted in Spain this week for allegedly collaborating with Al Qaeda. My Shadowland column will look at the case in detail, and its impact on press coverage, later today. If you want to delve deeper, you should start with the full transcript of Alouni's interview with Bin Laden in October 2001. - CD
Thursday, September 29, 2005
Iraq: Playing by the Numbers
The 'Second' Man
The slain Abu Azzam may not have been Zarqawi’s top deputy after all. Will his death have any effect on the Iraq insurgency?
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated: 4:31 p.m. ET Sept. 28, 2005
Sept. 28, 2005 - U.S. intelligence officials and counterterrorism analysts are questioning whether a slain terrorist—described by President Bush today as the “second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq”—was as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming....
See below. - CD
The slain Abu Azzam may not have been Zarqawi’s top deputy after all. Will his death have any effect on the Iraq insurgency?
WEB EXCLUSIVE
By Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball
Newsweek
Updated: 4:31 p.m. ET Sept. 28, 2005
Sept. 28, 2005 - U.S. intelligence officials and counterterrorism analysts are questioning whether a slain terrorist—described by President Bush today as the “second-most-wanted Al Qaeda leader in Iraq”—was as significant a figure as the Bush administration is claiming....
See below. - CD
Wednesday, September 28, 2005
Al Qaeda's Comeback Artists
This from The Washington Post report on the killing of Zarqawi's supposed Number Two:
...U.S. and Iraqi officials said Abu Azzam was killed Sept. 25 during a raid on his hideout in a high-rise apartment building in Baghdad when he refused to surrender to Iraqi and American troops.
The officials identified Abu Azzam as the operational commander for al Qaeda in Iraq, a group led by Zarqawi, whose insurgent network has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in the country.
A statement purportedly posted on an Islamist Web site Tuesday by al Qaeda in Iraq denied that Abu Azzam was Zarqawi's deputy and said the group was not yet sure if he had been killed. The statement called him "an al Qaeda soldier who heads one of al Qaeda's units operating in Baghdad." The authenticity of the statement could not immediately be confirmed.
"By taking Abu Azzam off the street, another close associate of Zarqawi, we have dealt another serious blow to Zarqawi's terrorist organization," Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a spokesman for coalition forces, said in a statement....
The problem is, we've been here before. In January, as Newsweek reported at the time, an Iraqi general claimed to have rounded up key Al Qaeda operatives after a suicide bomber miraculously survived, was meticulously interrogated, and named a lot of names:
...General Kamal says information supplied by al-Shayea helped Coalition forces round up several of Zarqawi's key lieutenants within a matter of days.
Among them is Abu Umar al-Kurdi, real name Sami Muhammad Saeed al-Jafi, a terrorist demolition man who confessed to 32 car bombings over the last two years. Even if Zarqawi continues to elude capture, nailing al-Kurdi was a critical score. It might—just might—eventually help change the course of this war that has seemed to defy political or military solutions, despite last weekend's elections, and despite an enormous toll in blood that included the loss just last week of 31 Americans in a nighttime helicopter crash.
The situation is not noticeably better today. Indeed it's notably worse.--CD
...U.S. and Iraqi officials said Abu Azzam was killed Sept. 25 during a raid on his hideout in a high-rise apartment building in Baghdad when he refused to surrender to Iraqi and American troops.
The officials identified Abu Azzam as the operational commander for al Qaeda in Iraq, a group led by Zarqawi, whose insurgent network has been responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in the country.
A statement purportedly posted on an Islamist Web site Tuesday by al Qaeda in Iraq denied that Abu Azzam was Zarqawi's deputy and said the group was not yet sure if he had been killed. The statement called him "an al Qaeda soldier who heads one of al Qaeda's units operating in Baghdad." The authenticity of the statement could not immediately be confirmed.
"By taking Abu Azzam off the street, another close associate of Zarqawi, we have dealt another serious blow to Zarqawi's terrorist organization," Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, a spokesman for coalition forces, said in a statement....
The problem is, we've been here before. In January, as Newsweek reported at the time, an Iraqi general claimed to have rounded up key Al Qaeda operatives after a suicide bomber miraculously survived, was meticulously interrogated, and named a lot of names:
...General Kamal says information supplied by al-Shayea helped Coalition forces round up several of Zarqawi's key lieutenants within a matter of days.
Among them is Abu Umar al-Kurdi, real name Sami Muhammad Saeed al-Jafi, a terrorist demolition man who confessed to 32 car bombings over the last two years. Even if Zarqawi continues to elude capture, nailing al-Kurdi was a critical score. It might—just might—eventually help change the course of this war that has seemed to defy political or military solutions, despite last weekend's elections, and despite an enormous toll in blood that included the loss just last week of 31 Americans in a nighttime helicopter crash.
The situation is not noticeably better today. Indeed it's notably worse.--CD
Tuesday, September 27, 2005
Iraq: The Usual (Innocent) Suspects
Larry Kaplow, a correspondent with Cox Newspapers, has about as much experience on the ground in occupied Iraq as any American reporter. His articles appear frequently in The Austin-American Statesman, from deep in the heart of the war to deep in the heart of Texas. Anyone who wants to keep track of unfolding events and vital details in this conflict should be reading Larry's reporting:
Detention of Iraqis may be fueling insurgency
Those arrested by U.S. military usually have done nothing wrong; many come away with new resentment.
By Larry Kaplow
INTERNATIONAL STAFF
Sunday, September 11, 2005
BAGHDAD, Iraq -- The U.S.-led dragnet for insurgents catches the harmless much more often than the dangerous, according to military figures, helping breed resentment among Iraqis who often languish in prison for months before the system sets them free.
Nearly 75 percent of all detainees arrested are being released because there is not enough evidence that they pose a threat, according to the Army.
About half are freed within days of their arrests by the units or divisions that captured them. But thousands of others are sent to major prisons, such as Abu Ghraib, where they wait an average of six months before being released, according to 1st Lt. Kristy Miller, spokeswoman for the military's detention system in Iraq.
From March 2003 through early last month, 42,228 Iraqi detainees had been sent into the system. As of Friday, 12,184 remained in U.S. detention...
Detention of Iraqis may be fueling insurgency
Those arrested by U.S. military usually have done nothing wrong; many come away with new resentment.
By Larry Kaplow
INTERNATIONAL STAFF
Sunday, September 11, 2005
BAGHDAD, Iraq -- The U.S.-led dragnet for insurgents catches the harmless much more often than the dangerous, according to military figures, helping breed resentment among Iraqis who often languish in prison for months before the system sets them free.
Nearly 75 percent of all detainees arrested are being released because there is not enough evidence that they pose a threat, according to the Army.
About half are freed within days of their arrests by the units or divisions that captured them. But thousands of others are sent to major prisons, such as Abu Ghraib, where they wait an average of six months before being released, according to 1st Lt. Kristy Miller, spokeswoman for the military's detention system in Iraq.
From March 2003 through early last month, 42,228 Iraqi detainees had been sent into the system. As of Friday, 12,184 remained in U.S. detention...
Pat Tillman: American Hero, American Tragedy
Robert Collier of The San Francisco Chronicle published a detailed account on Sunday of Pat Tillman's death by friendly fire, the investigation that followed and the evidence of a cover-up. It is both surprising and horrifying, as these few brief excerpts suggest:
...A Chronicle review of more than 2,000 pages of testimony, as well as interviews with Pat Tillman’s family members and soldiers who served with him, found contradictions, inaccuracies and what appears to be the military’s attempt at self-protection.
For example, the documents contain testimony of the first investigating officer alleging that Army officials allowed witnesses to change key details in their sworn statements so his finding that certain soldiers committed “gross negligence” could be softened.
Interviews also show a side of Pat Tillman not widely known — a fiercely independent thinker who enlisted, fought and died in service to his country yet was critical of President Bush and opposed the war in Iraq, where he served a tour of duty. He was an avid reader whose interests ranged from history books on World War II and Winston Churchill to works of leftist Noam Chomsky, a favorite author. ...
Tillman had been a great football player, and more:
Moved in part by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Tillman decided to give up his career, saying he wanted to fight al Qaeda and help find Osama bin Laden. He spurned the Cardinals’ offer of a three year, $3.6 million contract extension and joined the Army in June 2002 along with his brother Kevin, who was playing minor-league baseball for the Cleveland Indians organization.
Pat Tillman’s enlistment grabbed the attention of the nation — and the highest levels of the Bush administration. A personal letter from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, thanking him for serving his country, now resides in a storage box, put away by Pat’s widow, Marie.
Instead of going to Afghanistan, as the brothers expected, their Ranger battalion was sent to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Tillmans saw combat several times on their way to Baghdad. In early 2004, they finally were assigned to Afghanistan.
The account of precisely how Tillman died at the hands of men who were in fact his friends and admirers is the most succinct and persuasive I've seen:
... Although the Rangers are an elite combat group, the investigative documents reveal that the conduct of the Tillmans’ detachment — A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment — appeared to be anything but expert as it advanced through a remote canyon in eastern Afghanistan on April 22, 2004, on a mission to search for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in a village called Manah.
According to the files, when one of the humvees became disabled, thus stalling the mission, commanding officers split Tillman’s platoon in two so one half could move on and the other could arrange transport for the disabled vehicle. Platoon leader Lt. David Uthlaut protested the move as dangerous, but he was overruled. The first group was ordered out in the late afternoon, with Pat Tillman in the forward unit. Kevin’s unit followed 15 to 20 minutes later, hauling the humvee on an Afghan-owned flatbed truck. Both groups temporarily lost radio and visual contact with each other in the deep canyon, and the second group came under attack from suspected Taliban fighters on the surrounding ridges.
Pat Tillman, according to testimony, climbed a hill with another soldier and an Afghan militiaman, intending to attack the enemy. He offered to remove his 28-pound body armor so he could move more quickly, but was ordered not to. Meanwhile, the lead vehicle in the platoon’s second group arrived near Tillman’s position about 65 meters away and mistook the group as enemy. The Afghan stood and fired above the second group at the suspected enemy on the opposite ridge. Although the driver of the second group’s lead vehicle, according to his testimony, recognized Tillman’s group as “friendlies” and tried to signal others in his vehicle not to shoot, they directed fire toward the Afghan and began shooting wildly, without first identifying their target, and also shot at a village on the ridgeline.
The Afghan was killed. According to testimony, Tillman, who along with others on the hill waved his arms and yelled “cease fire,” set off a smoke grenade to identify his group as fellow soldiers. There was a momentary lull in the firing, and he and the soldier next to him, thinking themselves safe, relaxed, stood up and started talking. But the shooting resumed. Tillman was hit in the wrist with shrapnel and in his body armor with numerous bullets.
The soldier next to him testified: “I could hear the pain in his voice as he called out, ‘Cease fire, friendlies, I am Pat f—ing Tillman, dammit.” He said this over and over until he stopped,” having been hit by three bullets in the forehead, killing him.
The soldier continued, “I then looked over at my side to see a river of blood coming down from where he was … I saw his head was gone.” ...
There is much more, all of it sad, much of it infuriating.
Thanks to Jesse Kornbluth's Swami Uptown and The Cunning Realist for bringing the article to our attention. - CD
...A Chronicle review of more than 2,000 pages of testimony, as well as interviews with Pat Tillman’s family members and soldiers who served with him, found contradictions, inaccuracies and what appears to be the military’s attempt at self-protection.
For example, the documents contain testimony of the first investigating officer alleging that Army officials allowed witnesses to change key details in their sworn statements so his finding that certain soldiers committed “gross negligence” could be softened.
Interviews also show a side of Pat Tillman not widely known — a fiercely independent thinker who enlisted, fought and died in service to his country yet was critical of President Bush and opposed the war in Iraq, where he served a tour of duty. He was an avid reader whose interests ranged from history books on World War II and Winston Churchill to works of leftist Noam Chomsky, a favorite author. ...
Tillman had been a great football player, and more:
Moved in part by the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Tillman decided to give up his career, saying he wanted to fight al Qaeda and help find Osama bin Laden. He spurned the Cardinals’ offer of a three year, $3.6 million contract extension and joined the Army in June 2002 along with his brother Kevin, who was playing minor-league baseball for the Cleveland Indians organization.
Pat Tillman’s enlistment grabbed the attention of the nation — and the highest levels of the Bush administration. A personal letter from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, thanking him for serving his country, now resides in a storage box, put away by Pat’s widow, Marie.
Instead of going to Afghanistan, as the brothers expected, their Ranger battalion was sent to participate in the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The Tillmans saw combat several times on their way to Baghdad. In early 2004, they finally were assigned to Afghanistan.
The account of precisely how Tillman died at the hands of men who were in fact his friends and admirers is the most succinct and persuasive I've seen:
... Although the Rangers are an elite combat group, the investigative documents reveal that the conduct of the Tillmans’ detachment — A Company, 2nd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment — appeared to be anything but expert as it advanced through a remote canyon in eastern Afghanistan on April 22, 2004, on a mission to search for Taliban and al Qaeda fighters in a village called Manah.
According to the files, when one of the humvees became disabled, thus stalling the mission, commanding officers split Tillman’s platoon in two so one half could move on and the other could arrange transport for the disabled vehicle. Platoon leader Lt. David Uthlaut protested the move as dangerous, but he was overruled. The first group was ordered out in the late afternoon, with Pat Tillman in the forward unit. Kevin’s unit followed 15 to 20 minutes later, hauling the humvee on an Afghan-owned flatbed truck. Both groups temporarily lost radio and visual contact with each other in the deep canyon, and the second group came under attack from suspected Taliban fighters on the surrounding ridges.
Pat Tillman, according to testimony, climbed a hill with another soldier and an Afghan militiaman, intending to attack the enemy. He offered to remove his 28-pound body armor so he could move more quickly, but was ordered not to. Meanwhile, the lead vehicle in the platoon’s second group arrived near Tillman’s position about 65 meters away and mistook the group as enemy. The Afghan stood and fired above the second group at the suspected enemy on the opposite ridge. Although the driver of the second group’s lead vehicle, according to his testimony, recognized Tillman’s group as “friendlies” and tried to signal others in his vehicle not to shoot, they directed fire toward the Afghan and began shooting wildly, without first identifying their target, and also shot at a village on the ridgeline.
The Afghan was killed. According to testimony, Tillman, who along with others on the hill waved his arms and yelled “cease fire,” set off a smoke grenade to identify his group as fellow soldiers. There was a momentary lull in the firing, and he and the soldier next to him, thinking themselves safe, relaxed, stood up and started talking. But the shooting resumed. Tillman was hit in the wrist with shrapnel and in his body armor with numerous bullets.
The soldier next to him testified: “I could hear the pain in his voice as he called out, ‘Cease fire, friendlies, I am Pat f—ing Tillman, dammit.” He said this over and over until he stopped,” having been hit by three bullets in the forehead, killing him.
The soldier continued, “I then looked over at my side to see a river of blood coming down from where he was … I saw his head was gone.” ...
There is much more, all of it sad, much of it infuriating.
Thanks to Jesse Kornbluth's Swami Uptown and The Cunning Realist for bringing the article to our attention. - CD
Monday, September 26, 2005
Further Beyond Good and Evil
Name: michael allen
Hometown: LA, CA
Comments:
Loved your journal entry! One of the most insightful and poetic analysis of modern terrorism I've read. Not long ago, a Colorado congressman said that the USA should Nuke Mecca and Medina if the USA suffers a nuclear attack. From his point of view, "evil" is Islam. I wish someone had the balls to tell him and people who agree with him this. Nuking Islam for something a terrorist does would be like striking out at Ohio for what Timothy McVeigh did. Wasn't Tim from Ohio? Or strike back at the US army. Wasn't Tim a decorated Gulf War veteran. Or strike back at the Catholics. Wasn't Tim raised Catholic? Or strike back at the conservatives. Wasn't Tim an anti-goverment Republican? Or strike back at white people. He was white. Anyway you get the point. However, I don't know if our leaders or most of the voters do.
Hometown: LA, CA
Comments:
Loved your journal entry! One of the most insightful and poetic analysis of modern terrorism I've read. Not long ago, a Colorado congressman said that the USA should Nuke Mecca and Medina if the USA suffers a nuclear attack. From his point of view, "evil" is Islam. I wish someone had the balls to tell him and people who agree with him this. Nuking Islam for something a terrorist does would be like striking out at Ohio for what Timothy McVeigh did. Wasn't Tim from Ohio? Or strike back at the US army. Wasn't Tim a decorated Gulf War veteran. Or strike back at the Catholics. Wasn't Tim raised Catholic? Or strike back at the conservatives. Wasn't Tim an anti-goverment Republican? Or strike back at white people. He was white. Anyway you get the point. However, I don't know if our leaders or most of the voters do.
Shadowland Flashback: The Suicide Solution
"Here and Now," produced by Boston's WBUR Radio and broadcast on more than 40 stations nationwide in the United States, called today to talk about this Shadowland column from earlier in the month:
The Suicide Solution
What if suicide bombing were a disease? Could we find a cure? Some researchers think so.
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
Updated: 6:50 p.m. ET Sept. 7, 2005
Sept. 6, 2005 - Mohammad Sidique Khan’s voice-from-the-grave video got me thinking the other day. Most Americans were focused on the disaster in New Orleans, that city betrayed by the cupidity of shortsighted politicians, flooded with pestilence, plagued by chaos. Al-Jazeera’s broadcast on Thursday of the Yorkshire-accented musings of this Muslim fanatic who blew himself up in the London Underground two months ago in the attack that killed 52 innocents, seemed weirdly irrelevant given the scope of the national tragedy that now faces the United States.
Yet the next such cataclysm could easily be the work of men like Khan, who are willing to kill themselves to slaughter the maximum number of their enemies—meaning all of us in the American and British democracies. “I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe,” said Khan.
“Thousands.” Suicide attacks of one sort or another have been with us for a long time. But never, apart from Japan’s kamikazes during World War II, in such industrial quantities. What changed? And how can we reverse the trend?...
The Suicide Solution
What if suicide bombing were a disease? Could we find a cure? Some researchers think so.
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
Updated: 6:50 p.m. ET Sept. 7, 2005
Sept. 6, 2005 - Mohammad Sidique Khan’s voice-from-the-grave video got me thinking the other day. Most Americans were focused on the disaster in New Orleans, that city betrayed by the cupidity of shortsighted politicians, flooded with pestilence, plagued by chaos. Al-Jazeera’s broadcast on Thursday of the Yorkshire-accented musings of this Muslim fanatic who blew himself up in the London Underground two months ago in the attack that killed 52 innocents, seemed weirdly irrelevant given the scope of the national tragedy that now faces the United States.
Yet the next such cataclysm could easily be the work of men like Khan, who are willing to kill themselves to slaughter the maximum number of their enemies—meaning all of us in the American and British democracies. “I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe,” said Khan.
“Thousands.” Suicide attacks of one sort or another have been with us for a long time. But never, apart from Japan’s kamikazes during World War II, in such industrial quantities. What changed? And how can we reverse the trend?...
Iraq's Constitution: Formula for Civil War
This from the International Crisis Group report "Unmaking Iraq" (PDF) just out today:
Instead of healing the growing divisions between Iraq’s three principal communities -- Shiites, Kurds and Sunni Arabs -- a rushed constitutional process has deepened rifts and hardened feelings. Without a strong U.S.-led initiative to assuage Sunni Arab concerns, the constitution is likely to fuel rather than dampen the insurgency, encourage ethnic and sectarian violence, and hasten the country's violent break-up.
At the outset of the drafting process in June-July 2005, Sunni Arab inclusion was the litmus
test of Iraqi and U.S. ability to defeat the insurgency through a political strategy. When U.S. brokering brought fifteen Sunni Arab political leaders onto the Constitutional Committee, hopes were raised that an all-encompassing compact between the communities might be reached as a starting point for stabilising the country. Regrettably, the Bush administration chose to sacrifice inclusiveness for the sake of an arbitrary deadline, apparently in hopes of preparing the ground for a significant military draw-down in 2006. As a result, the constitution-making process became a new stake in the political battle rather than an instrument to resolve it.
Rushing the constitution produced two casualties. The first was consensus. Sunni Arabs felt increasingly marginalised from negotiations beginning in early August when these were moved from the Constitutional Committee to an informal forum of Shiite and Kurdish leaders, and have refused to sign on to the various drafts they were shown since that time. The text that has now been accepted by the Transitional National Assembly, in their view, threatens their existential interests by implicitly facilitating the country’s dissolution, which would leave them landlocked and bereft of resources....
Instead of healing the growing divisions between Iraq’s three principal communities -- Shiites, Kurds and Sunni Arabs -- a rushed constitutional process has deepened rifts and hardened feelings. Without a strong U.S.-led initiative to assuage Sunni Arab concerns, the constitution is likely to fuel rather than dampen the insurgency, encourage ethnic and sectarian violence, and hasten the country's violent break-up.
At the outset of the drafting process in June-July 2005, Sunni Arab inclusion was the litmus
test of Iraqi and U.S. ability to defeat the insurgency through a political strategy. When U.S. brokering brought fifteen Sunni Arab political leaders onto the Constitutional Committee, hopes were raised that an all-encompassing compact between the communities might be reached as a starting point for stabilising the country. Regrettably, the Bush administration chose to sacrifice inclusiveness for the sake of an arbitrary deadline, apparently in hopes of preparing the ground for a significant military draw-down in 2006. As a result, the constitution-making process became a new stake in the political battle rather than an instrument to resolve it.
Rushing the constitution produced two casualties. The first was consensus. Sunni Arabs felt increasingly marginalised from negotiations beginning in early August when these were moved from the Constitutional Committee to an informal forum of Shiite and Kurdish leaders, and have refused to sign on to the various drafts they were shown since that time. The text that has now been accepted by the Transitional National Assembly, in their view, threatens their existential interests by implicitly facilitating the country’s dissolution, which would leave them landlocked and bereft of resources....
Another Salvador Option
Much of the recent talk about "the Salvador option" in Iraq is misleading. But this trial, if and when it takes place, should shed some light on the history of what actually did happen in Central America two decades ago:
From the Center for Justice and Accountability:
El Salvador: Col. Nicolas Carranza
News & Commentary
Legal Documents
BackgroundThe 1979-1981 period in El Salvador was marked by rampant human rights abuses, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention and murder. The Security Forces, with assistance from "death squads," carried out widespread atrocities against suspected political “subversives,” including opposition political figures, members of labor unions, and people who provided care and education to the public, such as teachers, doctors, rescue workers and priests. Experts estimate that 10,000 to 12,000 unarmed civilians were killed in 1980 alone, including revered Salvadoran Archbishop Romero. CJA filed a separate case against one of the conspirators in the Romero assassination in September 2003.
Chavez v. Carranza
On December 10th, 2003, CJA filed a suit on behalf of several Salvadorans against former Salvadoran military commander Nicolas Carranza for the torture they endured and for the murder of their family members. The complaint was amended in February 2004 to add the claims of John Doe. On September 30, 2004, Judge Jon McCalla of the Western District of Tennessee denied Carranza’s motion to dismiss the case. The trial is scheduled for October 2005.Carranza, now a U.S. citizen living in Memphis, was Vice-Minister of Defense of El Salvador during the 1979-1981 period. In that position, he exercised command and control over the three units of the security forces – the National Guard, National Police and Treasury Police – responsible for most of the attacks on civilians. Despite being removed from his position as Vice-Minister due to U.S. pressure over his horrible human rights record, Carranza was later brought back in 1983 as head of the notorious Treasury Police, where he exercised command and control over the members of that group. The lawsuit also alleges that Carranza conspired with, or aided and abetted, subordinates in the security forces who carried out these abuses....
It will be especially interesting to see what, if anything, the trial brings out about Carranza's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, including allegations in the 1980s that Carranza was "on the payroll." --CD
From the Center for Justice and Accountability:
El Salvador: Col. Nicolas Carranza
News & Commentary
Legal Documents
BackgroundThe 1979-1981 period in El Salvador was marked by rampant human rights abuses, forced disappearances, arbitrary detention and murder. The Security Forces, with assistance from "death squads," carried out widespread atrocities against suspected political “subversives,” including opposition political figures, members of labor unions, and people who provided care and education to the public, such as teachers, doctors, rescue workers and priests. Experts estimate that 10,000 to 12,000 unarmed civilians were killed in 1980 alone, including revered Salvadoran Archbishop Romero. CJA filed a separate case against one of the conspirators in the Romero assassination in September 2003.
Chavez v. Carranza
On December 10th, 2003, CJA filed a suit on behalf of several Salvadorans against former Salvadoran military commander Nicolas Carranza for the torture they endured and for the murder of their family members. The complaint was amended in February 2004 to add the claims of John Doe. On September 30, 2004, Judge Jon McCalla of the Western District of Tennessee denied Carranza’s motion to dismiss the case. The trial is scheduled for October 2005.Carranza, now a U.S. citizen living in Memphis, was Vice-Minister of Defense of El Salvador during the 1979-1981 period. In that position, he exercised command and control over the three units of the security forces – the National Guard, National Police and Treasury Police – responsible for most of the attacks on civilians. Despite being removed from his position as Vice-Minister due to U.S. pressure over his horrible human rights record, Carranza was later brought back in 1983 as head of the notorious Treasury Police, where he exercised command and control over the members of that group. The lawsuit also alleges that Carranza conspired with, or aided and abetted, subordinates in the security forces who carried out these abuses....
It will be especially interesting to see what, if anything, the trial brings out about Carranza's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency, including allegations in the 1980s that Carranza was "on the payroll." --CD
Slouching Towards Shiastan
The American public missed a lot of important stories overseas during the Hurricane Katrina crisis. This is one that was reported in Newsweek International on Sept. 5, 2005:
Terror on the Tigris
The Shiites suffer a new tragedy—this time a stampede that kills hundreds. Is the creation of an oil-rich 'Shiastan' now becoming inevitable?
By Scott Johnson, with Joe Cochrane, Michael Hastings and Melinda Liu
... Imagine a Kurdistan run by ayatollahs. Iranian-style morality enforcers have been gaining strength in the south ever since the U.S. invasion. In formerly wide-open Basra, functioning liquor stores have become a rarity. The owners got too many death threats. Many Iraqi Christians are fleeing the area, moving to Baghdad and elsewhere. Women are increasingly afraid to leave their homes without a headscarf. Hard-liners in Nasiriya have reportedly been tearing down "get out the vote" posters that portrayed a woman with her hair visible. Some women may welcome the mullahs at first, as a force far more effective than the local police against street crime. "They think, 'Here comes a group of vigilantes that's providing us security'," says Manal Omar, Middle East coordinator for the activist group Women for Women International. "They don't realize how far it will go. It's what the Taliban did in Afghanistan."...
Terror on the Tigris
The Shiites suffer a new tragedy—this time a stampede that kills hundreds. Is the creation of an oil-rich 'Shiastan' now becoming inevitable?
By Scott Johnson, with Joe Cochrane, Michael Hastings and Melinda Liu
... Imagine a Kurdistan run by ayatollahs. Iranian-style morality enforcers have been gaining strength in the south ever since the U.S. invasion. In formerly wide-open Basra, functioning liquor stores have become a rarity. The owners got too many death threats. Many Iraqi Christians are fleeing the area, moving to Baghdad and elsewhere. Women are increasingly afraid to leave their homes without a headscarf. Hard-liners in Nasiriya have reportedly been tearing down "get out the vote" posters that portrayed a woman with her hair visible. Some women may welcome the mullahs at first, as a force far more effective than the local police against street crime. "They think, 'Here comes a group of vigilantes that's providing us security'," says Manal Omar, Middle East coordinator for the activist group Women for Women International. "They don't realize how far it will go. It's what the Taliban did in Afghanistan."...
Most Wanted: Flipper
From The Observer:Armed and dangerous
Flipper the firing dolphin let loose by Katrina by Mark Townsend HoustonSunday September 25, 2005
It may be the oddest tale to emerge from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Armed dolphins, trained by the US military to shoot terrorists and pinpoint spies underwater, may be missing in the Gulf of Mexico.
Experts who have studied the US navy's cetacean training exercises claim the 36 mammals could be carrying 'toxic dart' guns. Divers and surfers risk attack, they claim, from a species considered to be among the planet's smartest. The US navy admits it has been training dolphins for military purposes, but has refused to confirm that any are missing....
In the mid-1980s, when the United States was supporting Iraq in its war on Iran, it wasn't allowed to base any troops on Kuwaiti or Saudi soil (much less in Iraq). So in a bizarre compromise, it built huge floating bases on barges offshore. Worried about the threat for Iranian frogmen, it trained porpoises as watchdogs (watchdolphins?). Years later I was told by someone familiar with those operations that these highly trained imported animals fell in love with some of the local fauna and took off. They or their offspring may still be out there somewhere ... - CD
Sunday, September 25, 2005
Iran: Resolute Irresolution
The headlines about the IAEA resolution passed on Saturday move quickly from the notion of referral to the Security Council to the possiblity of sanctions. Read the resolution for yourself. After all the recallings and commendings and notings and deplorings and a very interesting "uncertain," the actual findings (followed by requests) are complete mush:
1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT SafeguardsAgreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute;
2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;
3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4; ....
From the official IAEA Web site:
IAEA Board of Governors Adopt Resolution on Iran
24 September 2005 At the end of week-long meetings beginning 19 September, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The resolution finds that Iran´s failures and breaches constitute non-compliance and calls on Iran to return to the negotiating process. It was adopted by a vote of 22 in favour, 1 against and 12 abstentions. Adopted Resolution [pdf] :: IAEA Board Report [pdf] :: Transcript of Director General´s Press Briefing :: Iran Coverage »
1. Finds that Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT SafeguardsAgreement, as detailed in GOV/2003/75, constitute non compliance in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency’s Statute;
2. Finds also that the history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the Director General’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security;
3. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement this and previous Resolutions and to report again, including any further developments on the issues raised in his report of 2 September 2005 (GOV/2005/67) to the Board. The Board will address the timing and content of the report required under Article XII.C and the notification required under Article III.B.4; ....
From the official IAEA Web site:
IAEA Board of Governors Adopt Resolution on Iran
24 September 2005 At the end of week-long meetings beginning 19 September, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution on the implementation of safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The resolution finds that Iran´s failures and breaches constitute non-compliance and calls on Iran to return to the negotiating process. It was adopted by a vote of 22 in favour, 1 against and 12 abstentions. Adopted Resolution [pdf] :: IAEA Board Report [pdf] :: Transcript of Director General´s Press Briefing :: Iran Coverage »
Lebanon: Another High-Profile Bombing
From Al-Jazeera's English-language site:
Journalist injured in Lebanon blast
above is right next to the asp:img closing tag with -->Sunday 25 September 2005, 19:14 Makka Time, 16:14 GMT
A prominent journalist working for an anti-Syrian television station has been seriously wounded after a bomb placed under her car exploded, Lebanese security officials say.
The officials said May Chidiac, who works for the private Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation, was inside her car when the bomb exploded on Sunday in the Christian port city of Jounieh, north of Beirut.
The officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Chidiac was injured and taken to hospital.
LBC, in a news flash, said the bomb was planted under the driver's seat of Chidiac's Range Rover and exploded as soon as she started the car.
The station said Chidiac, a longtime news anchor, was in critical condition and that her arms and one of her legs were amputated.
The front part of her car was burned and the car severely damaged, LBC reported. ...
May is, for want of a better analogy, the Diane Sawyer of Lebanese television. - CD
Zanzibar: Fear of Nature and the Nature of Fear
This is an intriguing Sunday morning meditation from my wandering friend Andrew Ehrenkranz, who's been in Africa a lot of late, but most recently has been holed up in Utah. When I read this, it started me thinking about the distance we used to believe existed between our rational societies and those that are still rife with superstition. Now, how sure can we be that we're so different? Is the theory of the shetani and their role in the rage of the sea any less plausible than the notion of "intelligent design"? - CD
Chris, I was thinking about spookery in an odd sense this weekend, as Rita was coming. And after she's fallen, it struck me again. We animate these hurricanes with names-- Katrina, Ivan,Camille-- like Poseidon's angry newborns, springing from our warm waters in a great tantrum. It is not a storm until it has a name, a name like our own, and though we can't comprehend its power or its devastation, we can speak of it like what its not-- human. I remember walking on a beach on the eastern coast of Zanzibar, near a small village called Bwejuii. I'd stopped to marvel at a particularly gargantuan beachfront villa, so architecturally decadent and seemingly so heavily secured, I'd become curious enough to ask a passerby who lived there. "Definitely a foreigner," he said, "Zanzibari's are afraid of the sea." Why, I asked? "Bad things live in the sea.. That's where the shetani sleep." Though not in the Judeo-Christian sense, Shetani means " devil", and since Zanzibar's an island, there's a lot of shetani here. Depending on who you talk to, a shetani is either a spirit that inhabits or takes possession of a human, or a human-like creature like a blue monkey with the head of a child and webbed feet. Shetani can be sent to you through a curse or just plain enter your life unannounced. If someone's life take's a turn for better or worse, a shetani, or a curse by the bush doctors controlling a number of shetani, had something to do with it. Things like this, I learned, happen for a reason The shetani have always been in Zanzibar, long before the Arabs or Europeans arrived, perhaps this part of Africa's original colonizers; young or old, strong or meek, Muslim or Christian, every Zanzibari, they say, has to contend with a shetani. Sure, most Zanzibari's eat fish, and are aware of the sea's charm and benefits, but few locals want to live anywhere near it. The sea, itself, isn't innately malevolent-- it's the devil spirits inhabiting it that make fierce winds, rough waters, and great waves. Best to keep away from the ocean, it's believed, if you want to steer clear of the shetani in your life. Let sleeping dog's lie, which incidentally is also something I learned Zanzibari's aren't too keen on, for differentsuperstitious reasons. There's a lot more to it obviously, and I've rambled, but it strikes me- when we fear the sea, it's a fear for what it can do. They fear it for what it contains. - Andrew
Chris, I was thinking about spookery in an odd sense this weekend, as Rita was coming. And after she's fallen, it struck me again. We animate these hurricanes with names-- Katrina, Ivan,Camille-- like Poseidon's angry newborns, springing from our warm waters in a great tantrum. It is not a storm until it has a name, a name like our own, and though we can't comprehend its power or its devastation, we can speak of it like what its not-- human. I remember walking on a beach on the eastern coast of Zanzibar, near a small village called Bwejuii. I'd stopped to marvel at a particularly gargantuan beachfront villa, so architecturally decadent and seemingly so heavily secured, I'd become curious enough to ask a passerby who lived there. "Definitely a foreigner," he said, "Zanzibari's are afraid of the sea." Why, I asked? "Bad things live in the sea.. That's where the shetani sleep." Though not in the Judeo-Christian sense, Shetani means " devil", and since Zanzibar's an island, there's a lot of shetani here. Depending on who you talk to, a shetani is either a spirit that inhabits or takes possession of a human, or a human-like creature like a blue monkey with the head of a child and webbed feet. Shetani can be sent to you through a curse or just plain enter your life unannounced. If someone's life take's a turn for better or worse, a shetani, or a curse by the bush doctors controlling a number of shetani, had something to do with it. Things like this, I learned, happen for a reason The shetani have always been in Zanzibar, long before the Arabs or Europeans arrived, perhaps this part of Africa's original colonizers; young or old, strong or meek, Muslim or Christian, every Zanzibari, they say, has to contend with a shetani. Sure, most Zanzibari's eat fish, and are aware of the sea's charm and benefits, but few locals want to live anywhere near it. The sea, itself, isn't innately malevolent-- it's the devil spirits inhabiting it that make fierce winds, rough waters, and great waves. Best to keep away from the ocean, it's believed, if you want to steer clear of the shetani in your life. Let sleeping dog's lie, which incidentally is also something I learned Zanzibari's aren't too keen on, for differentsuperstitious reasons. There's a lot more to it obviously, and I've rambled, but it strikes me- when we fear the sea, it's a fear for what it can do. They fear it for what it contains. - Andrew
The Coming War with Iran (in Iraq)
The clash between U.S. forces and Shia militias in Baghdad overnight is one of several skirmishes in recent days that probably mark the beginning of a widening confrontation between Coalition forces and Iranian backed militias. The worst so far have actually been in Basra, and the British press has covered them extensively. As The London Sunday Times wrote this morning, British troops "find themselves caught between insurgents bent on mayhem and local militias desperate to grab power." The coming vote on the constitution next month and national elections due in December have heightened the violence not only among those who oppose the process (largely Sunni Arabs), but among those participating in it who want to control it (various Shia factions).
The Times' narrative of how two British SAS men were captured, then freed last week, and what followed, is a riveting read that goes well beyond the paper's front-page report that the SAS men were involved in a secret war against Iranian agents:
Focus: Playing with fire
British troops are famed for winning hearts and minds but last week Basra erupted. Ali Rifat, Michael Smith and Richard Woods on an SAS mission that went horribly wrong
I was struck by this especially graphic passage:
'Not far away [in a stinking Basra hospital] lay another young victim, 13-year-old Raed Kareem, who was also in the vicinity when Iraqi demonstrators clashed with British troops trying to rescue the SAS men.
A bullet, which he blames on the British, hit him in the stomach, ripping through his liver and bowel.
“I was never politically motivated nor belonged to any of the militias or parties,” said Kareem. “But now I pray to Allah to cure me in order for me to take revenge on those detesters of everything Arab and Muslim.”
Money or compensation from the British are not what he wants. “I just want them to leave my country,” he said.'
And I found this analysis as succinct as it is indisputable:
'Gareth Stansfield, an expert in Middle East politics at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Exeter University, believes the Iranians are already the real winners from the Iraq war.
“Iraq has been delivered to Iran on a plate by the coalition,” he said. “It sits there as a powerful neighbour, with very complex and strong links in the south . . . and politically with the Kurds in the north.
“I would go so far as to say that the pre-eminent foreign force in Iraq is not the US, it is Iran. It has succeeded in its geopolitical aim — Iraq will never threaten them again — and it has tied up the US in a swamp of insurgencies.”'
We've been warning in Newsweek since 2002 that Iraq is much more friendly turf for Iran than it is for the United States, and if we occupied Iraq, we'd pay the price. We also warned in 2002 that the country could well come apart, pulling its neighbors into a regional war. A particularaly apocalyptic piece for Newsweek International called "Storm Clouds" (issue date Sept. 16, 2002, but no live link on the Web that I can find) began:
'When western diplomats in the Middle East talk among themselves, many compare the present moment to August 1914. Then, Europe was stumbling toward a cataclysm. So reckless was the rhetoric that a single terrorist act, an assassination in Sarajevo, would unleash the first world war. "There is a moment," says a U.S. State Department veteran, "when people are going about their daily lives, thinking things are bad but they'll get by. And then, from the morning to the afternoon, everything has changed and nothing will ever be the same." Ten years from now, the summer of 2002 may well be remembered as just such a moment for the Muslim world. Here's how the story will read:
The U.S. war on Iraq was short. The dictator Saddam Hussein fell more quickly than expected. The aftermath was far worse. After the United States pulled out, Iraq quickly splintered along ethnic and religious lines: Kurds in the north, Shiites in the south, a Sunni majority in between. Saudi Arabia followed, as the oil-rich east and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the west broke away from the reign of Riyadh in the center. The fall of the House of Saud was disastrous, ending decades of quiet partnership between Riyadh and Washington that had assured the world of a steady flow of affordable oil. The Middle East went topsy-turvy. Pro-American regimes were left at odds with their people, undermined by radicals preaching a new Pan-Islamic nationalism. By 2010 Al Qaeda was a name out of ancient history, but the new radical groups operating out of Africa, Europe and even the United States had U.S. policymakers nostalgic for Osama bin Laden...."
So much for prophecy. - CD
The Times' narrative of how two British SAS men were captured, then freed last week, and what followed, is a riveting read that goes well beyond the paper's front-page report that the SAS men were involved in a secret war against Iranian agents:
Focus: Playing with fire
British troops are famed for winning hearts and minds but last week Basra erupted. Ali Rifat, Michael Smith and Richard Woods on an SAS mission that went horribly wrong
I was struck by this especially graphic passage:
'Not far away [in a stinking Basra hospital] lay another young victim, 13-year-old Raed Kareem, who was also in the vicinity when Iraqi demonstrators clashed with British troops trying to rescue the SAS men.
A bullet, which he blames on the British, hit him in the stomach, ripping through his liver and bowel.
“I was never politically motivated nor belonged to any of the militias or parties,” said Kareem. “But now I pray to Allah to cure me in order for me to take revenge on those detesters of everything Arab and Muslim.”
Money or compensation from the British are not what he wants. “I just want them to leave my country,” he said.'
And I found this analysis as succinct as it is indisputable:
'Gareth Stansfield, an expert in Middle East politics at the Royal Institute of International Affairs and Exeter University, believes the Iranians are already the real winners from the Iraq war.
“Iraq has been delivered to Iran on a plate by the coalition,” he said. “It sits there as a powerful neighbour, with very complex and strong links in the south . . . and politically with the Kurds in the north.
“I would go so far as to say that the pre-eminent foreign force in Iraq is not the US, it is Iran. It has succeeded in its geopolitical aim — Iraq will never threaten them again — and it has tied up the US in a swamp of insurgencies.”'
We've been warning in Newsweek since 2002 that Iraq is much more friendly turf for Iran than it is for the United States, and if we occupied Iraq, we'd pay the price. We also warned in 2002 that the country could well come apart, pulling its neighbors into a regional war. A particularaly apocalyptic piece for Newsweek International called "Storm Clouds" (issue date Sept. 16, 2002, but no live link on the Web that I can find) began:
'When western diplomats in the Middle East talk among themselves, many compare the present moment to August 1914. Then, Europe was stumbling toward a cataclysm. So reckless was the rhetoric that a single terrorist act, an assassination in Sarajevo, would unleash the first world war. "There is a moment," says a U.S. State Department veteran, "when people are going about their daily lives, thinking things are bad but they'll get by. And then, from the morning to the afternoon, everything has changed and nothing will ever be the same." Ten years from now, the summer of 2002 may well be remembered as just such a moment for the Muslim world. Here's how the story will read:
The U.S. war on Iraq was short. The dictator Saddam Hussein fell more quickly than expected. The aftermath was far worse. After the United States pulled out, Iraq quickly splintered along ethnic and religious lines: Kurds in the north, Shiites in the south, a Sunni majority in between. Saudi Arabia followed, as the oil-rich east and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the west broke away from the reign of Riyadh in the center. The fall of the House of Saud was disastrous, ending decades of quiet partnership between Riyadh and Washington that had assured the world of a steady flow of affordable oil. The Middle East went topsy-turvy. Pro-American regimes were left at odds with their people, undermined by radicals preaching a new Pan-Islamic nationalism. By 2010 Al Qaeda was a name out of ancient history, but the new radical groups operating out of Africa, Europe and even the United States had U.S. policymakers nostalgic for Osama bin Laden...."
So much for prophecy. - CD
CSIS: Saudi Militants in Iraq
The problem of Saudi militants joining the jihad in Iraq, either to die or to train and take their skills home again, is one of the great and growing security concerns in the Middle East. It's a key reason the Saudi government is speaking out so strongly now about the dangers of all-out civil war in its neighbor to the north. A new report from the CSIS by Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman, written with substantial Saudi input, helps to clarify the situation. Its conclusion, the role of Saudis in Iraq has been exaggerated, but there's still a hell of a lot to worry about:
"Interrogations and other Saudi intelligence gathering operations reveal that these individuals do not come exclusively from a single geographical region in Saudi Arabia, but from various areas in the Kingdom, especially from the South, Hijaz, and Najd. They are usually affiliated with the most prominent conservative tribes and are generally middle class. Most are employed, many are educated, and all are Sunni. ...
"The average age of these fighters is 17-25, but a few are older. Some have families and young children. In contrast, other fighters from across the Middle East and North Africa tend to be in their late 20s or 30s. As part of a massive crackdown on Saudi militants attempting to enter Iraq, the Saudi government has interrogated dozens of nationals either returning from Iraq or caught at theborder. They were then questioned by the intelligence services about, among other things, their motives for joining the insurgency. One important point was the number who insisted that they were not militants before the Iraq war. Backing up this contention, of those who were interrogated, a full 85% were not on any government watch list (which comprised most of the recognized extremists and militants), nor were they known members of al-Qaeda. The names of those who died fighting in Iraq generally appear on militant websites as martyrs, and Saudi investigators have also approached the families of these individuals for information regarding the background and motivation of the ones who died. According to these interviews as well, the bulk of the Saudi fighters in Iraq were driven to extremism by the war itself. ... "
"Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom's Response," by Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Revised Sept. 19, 2005. (PDF file)
"Interrogations and other Saudi intelligence gathering operations reveal that these individuals do not come exclusively from a single geographical region in Saudi Arabia, but from various areas in the Kingdom, especially from the South, Hijaz, and Najd. They are usually affiliated with the most prominent conservative tribes and are generally middle class. Most are employed, many are educated, and all are Sunni. ...
"The average age of these fighters is 17-25, but a few are older. Some have families and young children. In contrast, other fighters from across the Middle East and North Africa tend to be in their late 20s or 30s. As part of a massive crackdown on Saudi militants attempting to enter Iraq, the Saudi government has interrogated dozens of nationals either returning from Iraq or caught at theborder. They were then questioned by the intelligence services about, among other things, their motives for joining the insurgency. One important point was the number who insisted that they were not militants before the Iraq war. Backing up this contention, of those who were interrogated, a full 85% were not on any government watch list (which comprised most of the recognized extremists and militants), nor were they known members of al-Qaeda. The names of those who died fighting in Iraq generally appear on militant websites as martyrs, and Saudi investigators have also approached the families of these individuals for information regarding the background and motivation of the ones who died. According to these interviews as well, the bulk of the Saudi fighters in Iraq were driven to extremism by the war itself. ... "
"Saudi Militants in Iraq: Assessment and Kingdom's Response," by Nawaf Obaid and Anthony Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Revised Sept. 19, 2005. (PDF file)
Newsweek Article: Saudi Storms
As hurricanes batter the American coast and send oil prices up, Al Qaeda is watching, and drawing lessons.
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
The shoot-out earlier this month around a seafront villa in the Saudi Arabian city of Ad Dammam lasted almost 48 hours, and ended only when security forces brought in light artillery. They blasted the opulent home until the roof came down on the people inside. In the immediate aftermath police said they couldn't tell from the charred remains just how many members of "a deviant group" had died in the battle. Finally, with DNA tests, they counted five. Police also found enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerrilla fighters. The inventory given out by the Saudi Interior Ministry included more than 60 hand grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, two barrels full of explosives, video equipment, a large amount of cash and forged documents. It was the documents that really set off alarms. ...
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
The shoot-out earlier this month around a seafront villa in the Saudi Arabian city of Ad Dammam lasted almost 48 hours, and ended only when security forces brought in light artillery. They blasted the opulent home until the roof came down on the people inside. In the immediate aftermath police said they couldn't tell from the charred remains just how many members of "a deviant group" had died in the battle. Finally, with DNA tests, they counted five. Police also found enough weapons for a couple of platoons of guerrilla fighters. The inventory given out by the Saudi Interior Ministry included more than 60 hand grenades and pipe bombs, pistols, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, two barrels full of explosives, video equipment, a large amount of cash and forged documents. It was the documents that really set off alarms. ...
Saturday, September 24, 2005
Saudi Impatience
The latest from Col. W. Patrick Lang (Ret.), formerly the "Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East, South Asia and Terrorism,” and later the first Director of the Defense Humint Service for the Defense Intelligence Agency. He's commenting on Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal's remarks in the New York Times that since before the invasion of Iraq, "the main worry of all the neighbors" was that the potential disintegration of Iraq into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish states would "bring other countries in the region into the conflict":
...Yesterday, I sat with a member of the Saudi royal family to discuss this problem. This American educated prince told me that the Saudi government is now very concerned about Iranian ambitions, not just in Iraq, but eventually throughout the area and especially with regard to the oil reserves in the Kingdom and the Islamic Holy places in the Hijaz. He told me that American behavior is incomprehensible to the Saudis.
I have been told by American observers at the recent OPEC Vienna meeting and other recent meetings in the Gulf that the Iranian delegations at these meetings behaved with great arrrogance toward the Saudis, saying in private that they (Iran) will have Iraq and that the Saudis, and others, should adjust their positions accordingly.
We are going to reap the whirlwind. There are those among us who probably think that will be good. I do not.
This note from a well-connected Saudi friend, though carefully measured, gives you some sense of the mood in Riyadh, Jeddah and the Waldorf in New York after the latest round of encounters with the Bush administration:
I have been observing recently that our meetings with American officials and scholars have become increasingly repetitive and ever less productive. We art told each time that the talks have been very good, that the Americans have listened, asked for our advice, and were generally responsive. But, ultimately, the actual effects of the talks have been very limited and American policy changes almost nil.
I am beginning to wonder whether the Americans are patronizing us and whether we are both wasting our time. It is time, I think, to apply different tactics.
From now on we should be the ones asking the Americans questions. We should ask them what they want to do in the Middle East, where exactly they are heading, what their true intentions are and how they intend to achieve them. They will realize that we are more than a mere sounding board or an ally that needs to be flattered. We should tell them: “We will gladly discuss options with you and tell you honestly what is achievable, but first you must be clear and candid with us. We are your friends and we can help you, but first you must tell us what it is you are doing and what it is you want.”
Through this reversal of roles we stand to learn far more about and from each other. We could open a new dimension in our talks, be more candid and transparent with each other; that is what a real partnership is about.
What is definitely not acceptable is to spend all our time trying to be polite and "understanding" in order not to distance ourselves too much from each other. We have understandably gone through a phase of rebuilding confidence with America but we have become so careful that we are missing the essence of important issues and avoiding disagreements which could be brought up more forcefully and constructively. This caution was arguably a necessary phase but it is not serving either of us anymore today.
I think it is time for us to rebuild our relationship with America on a new understanding. Rather than being called on for advice that is then discarded, we should find out exactly what the Americans want and how we can both accommodate our needs. It is time for a reversal of roles.
Prince Saud's press conference at the Saudi Embassy in Washington is also of interest.
My most recent on-the-record interview with Saud Al-Faisal was last May, when he was still trying to put the best face on an increasingly bad situaton. - CD
Al-Qaeda's Windbags
One has to consider the source, of course, but The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), co-founded by senior Israeli intelligence officer Yigal Carmon, does disseminate a lot of fascinating translations from the Arab and Muslim press. Today's is from something claiming to be a new weekly Al-Qaeda Internet broadcast, which was applauding the hurricanes for doing God's work in the United States. An excerpt:
"The entire Islamic world overflowed with joy when Hurricane Katrina struck in America, which seemed to reel from the strength of the hurricane and went asking for aid from all the countries of the world. Broken and completely humiliated, George Bush, a fool who is being obeyed, announced his obvious incapability to deal with the wrath of Allah that visited the city of homosexuals.
"While Louisiana is trying to recover from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, another hurricane fiercely struck the state of North Carolina, on the Atlantic coast, but so far there have been no casualties or significant damage, as was expected. We hope that Allah will humiliate America with this hurricane to make it a lesson for whoever wants to listen."
Enough of that. - CD
"The entire Islamic world overflowed with joy when Hurricane Katrina struck in America, which seemed to reel from the strength of the hurricane and went asking for aid from all the countries of the world. Broken and completely humiliated, George Bush, a fool who is being obeyed, announced his obvious incapability to deal with the wrath of Allah that visited the city of homosexuals.
"While Louisiana is trying to recover from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, another hurricane fiercely struck the state of North Carolina, on the Atlantic coast, but so far there have been no casualties or significant damage, as was expected. We hope that Allah will humiliate America with this hurricane to make it a lesson for whoever wants to listen."
Enough of that. - CD
Friday, September 23, 2005
Shadowland column: Rita's Revelation
As oil prices soar, so will demands for atomic energy. Iran knows this and Americans should, too. Why it's time to rethink the global approach to nuclear proliferation.
WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
Updated: 3:27 p.m. ET Sept. 23, 2005
Sept. 23, 2005 - Acts of God are on everyone's mind just now. They're forcing mass evacuations, inundating cities, driving up the cost of gasoline, weakening the economy, undermining the war effort in Iraq. The Almighty is so often on the tongue of politicians these days, both American and foreign, that invocations of the divine have started to sound like little more than boilerplate. Of course, over the years, few politicians have called on God more often or more automatically than the leaders in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
So when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke to the United Nations last Saturday, it shouldn't have surprised anybody that his language was fit for a Revolutionary Guard revival meeting. Peace and tranquility depend on "justice and spirituality," he kept saying. "Faith will prove to be the solution to many of today's problems." You might hear the same pieties from our own zealous politicos. But here's the problem: on the question of nuclear proliferation—a very big question indeed—Iran's fundamentalists seem to have a clearer sense of fundamental realities that ours do....
For more: Newsweek.com.
WEB-EXCLUSIVE COMMENTARY
By Christopher Dickey
Newsweek
Updated: 3:27 p.m. ET Sept. 23, 2005
Sept. 23, 2005 - Acts of God are on everyone's mind just now. They're forcing mass evacuations, inundating cities, driving up the cost of gasoline, weakening the economy, undermining the war effort in Iraq. The Almighty is so often on the tongue of politicians these days, both American and foreign, that invocations of the divine have started to sound like little more than boilerplate. Of course, over the years, few politicians have called on God more often or more automatically than the leaders in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
So when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad spoke to the United Nations last Saturday, it shouldn't have surprised anybody that his language was fit for a Revolutionary Guard revival meeting. Peace and tranquility depend on "justice and spirituality," he kept saying. "Faith will prove to be the solution to many of today's problems." You might hear the same pieties from our own zealous politicos. But here's the problem: on the question of nuclear proliferation—a very big question indeed—Iran's fundamentalists seem to have a clearer sense of fundamental realities that ours do....
For more: Newsweek.com.
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